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This document is intended for the use of network administrators and people with a knowledge of 
networking. It aims to provide guidelines for people intending to migrate to IPv6. The practical im-
plementation can be used in a production environment. 
 
The goal of the project was to implement and transition from IPv4 to IPv6 in a small to medium 
size network using the best current practices and security. Due to the exhaustion of IPv4 ad-
dresses, migration to IPv6 has become a necessity. A native IPv6 network will be time-consuming 
and expensive to implement, due to the expertise required and the necessity of IPv6 compatible 
devices. 
 
Security is a vital aspect of the migration process. Due to the unique structure of the IPv6 protocol, 
new attacks and security concerns arise and some IPv4 attacks still exist. This project evaluated 
and provided security considerations for the secure deployment of an IPv6 network including ex-
tension header threats, first-hop security concerns and IPsec. 
 
Transition mechanisms allow enterprises to adapt to IPv6 while maintaining an existing IPv4 net-
work. This gradual migration minimises the network disruption, as well as offers considerable ben-
efits, such as cost and time-efficiency, scalability and simpler deployment. During this project, two 
of the most commonly used methods, dual-stacking and tunnelling, were implemented and tested 
in a laboratory environment. This project was carried out using Cisco routers and switches, and for 
the end terminals, Windows desktop computers were used.  
 
The project resulted in the creation of two redundant networks, with two completely different tran-
sition mechanisms, dual-stack and tunnelling. For each mechanism, various tests and experi-
ments were conducted in order to study the networks performance and to gain a deeper 
knowledge of the technologies in use.  
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1 Introduction 
 
The Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) is the most recent version of the Internet Protocol 
(IP), the communications protocol. It provides an identification and location system for 
computers on networks and is used to route traffic across the Internet. IPv6 was devel-
oped by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) as replacement for Internet Protocol 
version 4 (IPv4). This deals with the long-anticipated problem of address exhaustion and 
the finite number of Autonomous System (AS) numbers. Based on RFC 6996, the ma-
jority of private use AS numbers have already been deployed.  
 
The choice of this project is due to the fact that the transitioning between IPv4 and IPv6 
is currently high on the agenda for many organisations and governments. In comparison 
to IPv4, IPv6 is evolving and therefore there is limited experience of IPv6 networks. At 
present, the transition between protocols is an ongoing process and therefore realistic 
scenarios were chosen for this project. 
 
The client, Company West (CW), is a fictitious company existing only in the laboratory 
(Lab) environment. The company, although limited in network size, encompasses many 
of the characteristics of a real organisation and the problems faced are identical. The 
aim of this project is to implement two common transition scenarios when transitioning 
to IPv6 while maintaining parts of the enterprise network as IPv4. 
 
During the implementation, dual-stack mechanisms, where the Internet Service Provider 
(ISP) will be dual-stacked to provide connectivity to the IPv6 network, and IPv6 tunnel-
ling, which allows IPv6 domains to connect over an IPv4 ISP, will be implemented. Some 
security aspects of the IPv6 protocol will be implemented and evaluated as well. [1.] 
2 Theoretical Background 
The number of individual users on the Internet is expanding at a significant rate. Com-
paring the total number of individual Internet users in 2005 (2048 million) to 2014 (5846 
million), shows a growth of 3799 million new individual Internet users. This shows an 
increase of close to 4 billion new users in ten years as illustrated in figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Individual Internet Usage (* Estimated) [2]. 
 
The Internet growth has been especially significant in the developing countries as can 
be seen in figure 1. As approximately two thirds of today’s Internet users live in develop-
ing countries, a higher growth rate is expected with the expanding mobile-broadband 
access. [2] 
 
On 3rd February 2011, the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), the body re-
sponsible for the global coordination of the Domain Name System (DNS) Root, IP ad-
dressing and other Internet protocol resources, allocated the last of the /8 address blocks 
to each of the Regional Internet Registries (RIR). Of the five RIR’s, only the American 
Registry of Internet Numbers (ARIN) and the African Internet Numbers Registry (AfriNIC) 
have any addresses left, with ARIN expecting to run out of addresses in May 2015 and 
AfriNIC expecting to run out in the next few years. [3] 
 
On 20th May 2014, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), 
began the process of allocating the remaining blocks of IPv4 addresses to the five RIR’s. 
These are from the IANA IPv4 Recovered Address Space registry. Due to the existing 
IPv4 addressing scheme exhaustion and in order to accommodate the significant in-
crease in usage, the need to move to IPv6 has become essential.  
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The IPv4 and IPv6 protocols are designed for Internet communication and share many 
similarities, there are however some differences between these two protocols which are 
discussed in more detail in section 2.1. [4] 
 
2.1 An Overview of IPv6 
 
2.1.1 The IPv6 Address Structure and Header 
 
IPv6 uses a 128-bit address, illustrated in figure 2 and provides a large address space 
of approximately 7.9×1028 times as many as IPv4. IPv4 as illustrated in figure 3, uses a 
32-bit address and provides approximately 4.3 billion addresses.  
 
Figure 2. IPv6 128 Bit Address 
 
Comparisons between the 128 bit address format that is required for the IPv6 protocol 
and a typical 32 bit address format of an IPv4 address are demonstrated in figure 2 and 
figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. IPv4 32 Bit Address 
 
The IPv6 header consists of two parts, the main header (MH) and the extension header 
(EH). The MH is same as the IPv4 header but with some improvements to enhance 
performance. The similarities and differences between these two protocol headers is il-
lustrated in figure 4. 
 
 
2001:0db8:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:0001 
 
192.168.100.125 
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Figure 4. Differences between IPv4 and IPv6 Headers   
 
As shown in figure 4, it is clear that the IPv6 header is more streamlined. The separate 
IPv6 EH is between the IPv6 Header and the Upper Layer Header and can travel com-
pletely unchecked along a route, until the packet reaches the destination. The Hop-by-
Hop header, an EH, is the one exception to this. [1.] 
 
2.1.2 IPv6 Enhanced Features 
 
The IPv4 address depletion was not the only reason for the design of IPv6, but it was 
also to overcome other issues associated with IPv4. The Public-to-Private Network Ad-
dress Translation (NAT) was developed as a solution for the limited number of IPv4 ad-
dresses. IPv6 eliminates the need for NAT due to the much larger address pool. Unlike 
IPv4, IPv6 does not have broadcast addresses. Instead it has unicast, multicast and 
anycast addresses. 
 
IPv6 improves router efficiency by using a simplified header that includes 
 Routing efficiency for performance and forwarding-rate scalability 
 No requirement for processing checksums 
 Simpler and more efficient EH mechanisms  
 Flow labels for per-flow processing  
 No need to examine transport layer information to identify the various traffic 
flows.  
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Another significant advantage of IPv6 over IPv4 is mobility and security. The mobile IP 
is an IETF standard that enables users to move around in a network without a break in 
connectivity. The mobile IP is available for both IPv4 and IPv6. However IPv4 requires 
additional configuration as it is not configured automatically. In IPv6, mobility is a built-in 
feature which makes it more efficient for end-users. [5,693.] 
 
The IPv6 address has some unique features that add to its flexibility, including the fol-
lowing: 
 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration (SLAAC), which includes the device’s data 
link layer address to IPv6 address.  
 Prefix renumbering, where the router advertises the new prefix and the other de-
vices in the network can begin to use it. This mechanism simplifies address and 
prefix renumbering. 
 Multi address per interface of various types that they run simultaneously. 
 Link local address will automatically be created on each interface. One of the 
uses is in the Interior Gateway Protocol (IGP) as the next hop address when 
exchanging routing updates. 
 
Provider-dependent or provider-independent addressing that allows enterprises to 
choose to use addresses from the ISP or their own provider-independent addressing 
space. [5,694.] 
 
2.1.3 IPv6 Address Types 
 
There are three types of IPv6 addresses, unicast, anycast and multicast and each of 
these individual types is identified by the first bits in the left hand side of the address. 
Important to note is the 0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0 address, the unspecified address, which may 
never be assigned to any node and signifies the absence of an address.   
 Unicast is used for a single interface, similar to an IPv4 address. A packet sent 
to a unicast address is delivered to the interface with the specified address. It 
encompasses the entire IPv6 address range, with the exception of the FF00::/8 
range, which is used for multicast addresses. There are multiple types of unicast 
addresses including, global unicast, link-local and unique local. The following fig-
ure 5 demonstrates the scope of different unicast addresses. 
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Figure 5. Scope of Different Unicast Addresses  
 
As demonstrated in figure 5 above, global unicast addresses are globally routable on the 
public Internet. Unique local addresses (ULA) are for communication within a site and 
routable to multiple local networks, but they are not globally routable. Link local ad-
dresses are private addresses that are not globally routable.  
 Multicast identifies a group of different device interfaces. Packets to multicast are 
delivered to the interface group using a multicast address for identification. 
 Anycast identifies a group of different device interfaces. Packets to anycast are 
delivered to the closest interface using a anycast address for identification and 
therefore the interface group provides a uniform service. [5,704-705;6.] 
 
2.1.4 IPv6 Routing Protocols 
 
Prior to configuring any IPv6 routing protocol, IPv6 routing needs to be enabled using 
the Cisco Internetwork Operating System (IOS) IPv6 unicast-routing command, in global 
configuration mode. 
 
Static routes in IPv6 are configured and used in the same way as in IPv4. An example 
of where static routes can be used, is in connecting the headquarters (HQ) to a Branch 
Office to avoid unnecessary routing overhead.  
 
The IGP is used for routing within an AS. One of the most commonly used IGP’s in IP 
networking is Open Shortest Path First (OSPF). OSPFv3 is the new protocol implemen-
tation for IPv6. Most of the algorithms in OSPFv2 and OSPFv3 are similar, but changes 
were made in OSPFv3 to handle the larger address space of IPv6. Although the general 
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mechanism is the same in both versions, the internals of the protocol are different in 
OSPFv3.  OSPFv2 and OSPFv3 run independently of each other, that is, if they are both 
configured on the same router, they each run a separate shortest path first (SPF) in-
stance. Some of the IPv6 specific features of OSPFv3 include:  
 Using a link local address as the source address 
 Allowing multiple addresses and OSPF instances per interface  
 Supporting authentication  
 Running over a link rather than a subnet 
 Removing every OSPFv2 IPv4-specific semantic 
 
When configuring OSPFv3 for an internal network, it is important to understand how it 
differs from OSPFv2 and the differences in the configuration. As OSPFv2 was designed 
to support the IPv4 address family and OSPFv3 can support both or either, there are 
differences when configuring OSPF on a Cisco IOS router for IPv4 as opposed to IPv6. 
For example, OSPFv3 has fewer commands under the routing protocol but there are 
more configurations that are configured under the interface, such as the type of the in-
terface and the area. 
 
Other notable changes, are that for IPv6, all the show commands with the keyword IP in 
them, are replaced with IPv6 and the OSPF keyword with OSPFv3. The biggest change 
in configuration is in the address-family structure, both the IPv4 and IPv6 address-fami-
lies are configured under router OSPFv3. However only the IPv4 address family is con-
figured under OSPFv3, after all of the interfaces are configured with IPv4, they should 
only then, be IPv6-enabled. This feature allows an interface to have multiple router pro-
cesses, but only one process per address family. [5,747-772;7;8;9.] 
 
2.2 Transitioning To IPv6 
 
2.2.1 Preliminary Transition Considerations 
 
Due to the complexity and the cost involved in fully transitioning an existing IPv4 network 
to IPv6, various methods have been developed in order to minimize the disruption and 
cost. The costs involved in deploying IPv6 depends upon various factors including the 
number of products, applications and deployment strategy. Fixed costs include training 
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and personnel while variable costs can be dependent on expertise, network devices and 
IPv6-compatible applications.  
 
Multiple factors need to be taken into consideration prior to transition a network to IPv6. 
Once the preliminary preparation for transition has been completed, a decision needs to 
be made as to which mechanisms will be utilised to achieve the desired goal. The Best 
current practice (BCP) recommends that the way forward is to use dual-stack mecha-
nisms when the ISP is able to provide IPv6 addresses and connectivity. However in the 
case of the ISP being unable to provide IPv6, tunnelling needs to be used. Where com-
panies have an existing IPv4 network that works perfectly, investing in a completely new 
IPv6 network would cause major disruption as well as significant costs incurred in the 
investment of new devices. Using a transition mechanism, enables retaining the existing 
structure to utilise IPv6. In effect, this means that as components need to be replaced, 
they can be upgraded to IPv6 compliancy. 
 
It is the companies’ responsibility to contact their ISP and discover what their current and 
planned support for IPv6 is. It is important to have a list of the required services and 
items when negotiating with ISPs. There are many considerations to take into account, 
such as 
 support for Border Gate Protocol (BGP) peering over IPv6  
 maximum accepted prefix by ISP 
 support for dual-stack 
 any additional costs for IPv6 services 
 performance and support for IPv6. [11] 
 
This is a brief list of items that need to be considered when transitioning. Some of the 
ISPs do not yet have native IPv6 and they are only able to provide the necessary support 
by providing a separate circuit or a tunnel interface. After contacting the ISP and obtain-
ing the IPv6 addresses, the next step is to evaluate the current network devices. It is 
important to do a thorough audit of the platforms and associated software and to check 
their support for IPv6. After ensuring the ISP is able to offer dual-stack support and that 
all the necessary software and hardware supports IPv6, with the necessary expertise 
and time, dual-stack is the best approach and the most practised method. In situations 
where the ISP is not able to give the needed support for IPv6, there are alternative meth-
ods to explore such as tunnelling. [10;11.] 
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2.2.2 Dual-Stack Mechanism 
 
Dual-stack is one of the primary and most often used methods that makes transition to 
IPv6 possible. In dual-stack, the stacks can be on either multiple interfaces or the same 
interface and each node has both IPv4 and IPv6 connectivity. The node decides where 
the packet is destined for, dependent upon the destination address of the packet. 
 
Dual-stack is one of the most commonly used methods because it allows the existing 
IPv4 application to continue running as before, while IPv6 will be added without causing 
any disruption to the existing network. As soon as IPv4 and IPv6 configurations are com-
pleted on an interface, the interface is dual-stacked and starts forwarding both IPv4 and 
IPv6 traffic.  
 
A drawback of dual-stack, is the resources that each device requires for each protocol. 
The device processes each protocol independently and must keep a record of dual rout-
ing protocols, routing protocol topology tables. There is also increased administrative 
complexity such as troubleshooting and monitoring. 
 
2.2.3 Tunnelling Mechanism 
 
Tunnels are often used to overcome the incompatibility of the underlying network to sup-
port the required services. For IPv6, tunnelling is one of the migration methods, allowing 
for IPv6 network connectivity without the need to convert the intermediary network to 
IPv6. This is ideal in the situation where the ISP is not IPv6-enabled. This concept is 
more clearly demonstrated in figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 6. IPv6 Packets Inside IPv4 Packets  
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As shown in figure 6, an IPv4 network is the intermediary network between two IPv6 
sites. In order to have connectivity between the sites, a tunnel is configured. The con-
nection is achieved by allowing IPv6 packets to be encapsulated inside IPv4 packets. 
 
The GRE protocol is a tunnelling protocol developed by Cisco Systems, and is the default 
tunnelling protocol on Cisco routers. The GRE protocol allows for several different net-
work layer protocols. Packets are sent through a virtual point-to-point tunnel link. The 
tunnel interfaces for the IPv6 configuration, are manually created and each interface is 
configured with an IPv6 address manually and do not have an IPv4 address. The tunnel 
uses a physical interface to route the traffic and this physical interface has an IPv4 ad-
dress. The BCP is to use a loopback interface for the tunnel source and destination, as 
it only goes down if the router goes down. This increases the stability of the tunnel as a 
real physical interface can go down for various reasons, such as physical failure or data 
link layer problems. The loopback with an IPv4 address should be reachable from any 
point within the network. Figure 7 illustrates the concept of a tunnel interface running 
over a physical interface.  
 
 
Figure 7. Tunnel Interface Running Over a Physical Interface  
 
Using figure 7 as an example, the concept remains the same when using the loopback 
interface for the tunnel instead of the physical interface. 
 
It is important to note that, the GRE protocol tunnel does not encrypt the data, and the 
data travels through the tunnel in clear text. To assure the confidentiality and integrity of 
data, a security mechanism such as Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) needs to be im-
plemented. The GRE protocol over an IPsec tunnel supports multicast IPv6 traffic and 
encrypts the data. [5,826-845.] 
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3 Materials and Methods 
 
3.1 Existing Operational Environment 
 
CW represents an enterprise transitioning to IPv6. The company network is being imple-
mented in a controlled lab environment and is currently running IPv4. The company HQ 
is connected to the Finance branch over the Internet. For the purposes of redundancy 
and to increase the reliability of the Internet connection, HQ is connected to the Internet 
using two different ISPs. This is called multihomed ISP connectivity, with redundancy 
built into the design, and is therefore resistant to a single ISP failure. The route to ISP1 
is selected as the primary route with a metric of 210 and the route to ISP2 as a back-up 
route with a metric of 220. In the event of the failure of the link to ISP1, the network traffic 
will automatically be routed via ISP2. 
 
The internal network of the company runs the OSPFv2 protocol. HQ is connected to the 
OSPF area 0 backbone and the site Finance to OSPF area 1. The network has been 
logically segmented into Virtual Local Area Networks (VLAN’s), with VLAN 10 for users 
at HQ and VLAN 20 for users of the Finance site. Each access layer switch has a sepa-
rate VLAN 99 configured for management and is assigned an IP address. Certain net-
work security measures were implemented as a baseline on all devices. Password pro-
tection was enabled on all telnet and console connections. Switches are protected 
against Media Access Control (MAC) flooding or a spoofing attack, port security is con-
figured on the VLAN 10 and VLAN 20 access ports.  
 
Most of the users in HQ use desktop workstations and the MAC addresses do not change 
very often. Therefore VLAN 10 is configured with sticky learning. Each port on this VLAN 
allows for a maximum of two MAC addresses to be dynamically learned. In VLAN 20, 
the users have more mobile devices such as laptops and therefore only port security is 
enabled to allow mobility in the network. In order to secure Dynamic Host Configuration 
Protocol (DHCP) against denial of service (DoS) and man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, 
DHCP snooping is enabled on access layer switches and the DHCP request rate per 
second is limited to 20 on the user’s access ports. Route filtering is configured on both 
R1 and R2 to avoid transit traffic through the company network. All the unused device 
ports are set as administratively down and in order to minimize the propagation of flap-
ping routes across the internetwork, BGP route dampening is enabled on routers.  There 
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is now full connectivity and reachability across the existing network and the connections 
to ISPs are learned through BGP, as shown in figure 8. [12;13.] 
 
 
Figure 8. Company West Current IPv4 Network Topology  
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The addressing scheme of the current topology of the company is illustrated in table 1. 
 
Table 1. Company West IPv4 Network Addressing Scheme 
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To implement this lab the following network devices were used and the following table 2 
shows the list and detail of the devices. 
 
Table 2. Company West Network Device Summary. 
 
 
To accommodate the company’s growth, it was decided the site Finance currently run-
ning IPv4 needed to expand and a new site Research and Engineering needed to be 
added to the existing network. 
 
To facilitate future expansion, access to limitless IP addresses and mobility, the company 
decided to run IPv6. The branch office Finance will run both IPv4 and IPv6 as new sites, 
Research and Engineering will be native IPv6, while the HQ will remain IPv4. CW will 
use transition mechanisms to migrate to IPv6 and gradually implement IPv6 throughout 
the entire network. 
 
There will be two scenarios for CW transition. In scenario one, the ISP1 is able to provide 
IPv6 services to the company and the routers will be configured as dual-stack. In the 
second scenario, the ISP is unable to provide IPv6 and therefore the connection to the 
sites will be accomplished by using a tunnelling mechanism. The topology in both sce-
narios is the same except where the ISP1 will be disconnected from the network to 
demonstrate the second scenario. All the new devices such as switches will be config-
ured in accordance with the existing network requirements. 
 
Switch Model IOS Ethernet Interfaces Gigabit Interfaces
Cisco Catalyst 2960 
(C2960-LANBASEK9-M)
Version 15.0(2) SE6
Release Software (fc1)
Fa0/1-24 Gi0/1-2
Cisco Catalyst 3560 PoE - 24
(C3560-IPSERVICESK9-M)
Version 12.2(55) SE9
Release Software (fc1)
Fa0/1-24 N/A
Router Model IOS Serial Interfaces Gigabit Interfaces
Cisco 2911
(C2900-UNIVERSALK9-M)
Version 15.2(3) T
Release Software (fc1)
S0/0/0 -1 Gi0/0-1
End Device Operating System Terminal Emulator
Computer Windows 7 (SP1) Tera Term VT (ver 4.86)
Device Summary
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3.2 Dual-Stack Scenario 
 
In accordance with the Request for Comments (RFC) 6180, for documentation purposes 
the 2001:db8::/32 IPv6 address range is used. In order to differentiate between the com-
pany assigned IPv6 addresses and the Internet address, Lo 1 on ISP1 has the address 
of 3001:db8::10/128. A successful ping to this Lo 1 means that there is connectivity to 
the IPv6 Internet.  
 
The basic prefix structures for this network are: 
 Site prefix --/48 
 VLAN or non-Point-to-Point links --/68 
 Point-to-Point links --/127. 
 
After the request of the company for an IPv6 address, ISP1 will provide the company 
with an address block of 2001:db8:1::/48. Figure 9 is a demonstration of the logical view 
of the network and how dual-stack works. 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Dual-Stack Logical View 
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Figure 9 shows how each stack runs completely independently of the other and the rout-
ers forward the packets based on the destination address [10]. 
 
3.2.1 Testing IPv6 Implementation 
 
For the purpose of testing the IPv6 implementation, a ULA of FD01:db8::/32 was config-
ured for the Finance site. A ULA is similar to an IPv4 private address and is for use in a 
private network. They are not routable in the global IPv6 Internet. In order to configure 
the IPv6 in site Finance, IPv6 routing between R2 and Personal Computer (PC) 2, needs 
to be enabled. The IPv6 ULA will be assigned on interface Gigabit Ethernet Interface (Gi)  
0/0 of R2 using the SLAAC feature. The SLAAC mechanism allows the generation of its 
own addresses by the host as well as autoconfiguration of the hosts.  
 
 The IPv6 SLAAC is a mechanism that allows a host to generate its own addresses using 
a combination of locally available information and information advertised by routers and 
therefore requires no manual configuration of hosts. When a host requires an IPv6 ad-
dress, it will send an Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) Router Solicitation 
(RS) requesting the link information. The router responds with an ICMPv6 router adver-
tisement that provides the IPv6 prefix and the host checks for its availability using dupli-
cate address detection (DAD) and then starts using the address.  
 
 After configuration, hosts on this site can automatically configure themselves by adding 
their IPv6 interface identifier to the local link 64-bit prefix. This method demonstrates how 
Extended Unique Identity (EUI-64) works. [5,720;14;15.]   
 
The following commands were entered on R2: 
 
R2(config)# ipv6 unicast-routing 
R2(config)# int gi0/0 
R2(config-if)# ipv6 address fd01:db8:1:1::/64 eui-64 
 
Listing 1. Autoconfiguration using EUI-64 method 
 
After entering the configuration in listing 1, the debug command for Neighbor Discovery 
(ND) was enabled on R2 to observe how it works. Figure 10 demonstrates the result. 
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Figure 10. The Debug Output for Neighbor Discovery 
 
As the debug output in figure 10 demonstrates, the link is autoconfigured and the router 
includes an additional Type Length Value (TLV) to Router Advertisement (RA) mes-
sages. 
 
Link-local addresses are locally significant and are dynamically created on all IPv6 ena-
bled interfaces using the specific link-local prefix of FE80::/10 and a 64-bit interface iden-
tifier. This is illustrated in in the highlighted area of listing 2, of the output of interface 
Gi0/0 
 
R2#show ipv6 interface gi0/0 
GigabitEthernet0/0 is up, line protocol is up 
IPv6 is enabled, link-local address is 
FE80::DA67:D9FF:FE84:20B8 
No Virtual link-local address(es): 
Global unicast address(es): 
FD01:DB8:1:1:DA67:D9FF:FE84:20B8, subnet is 
FD01:DB8:1:1::/64 [EUI] 
<output omitted> 
 
Listing 2. Interface Gi0/0 Output  
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After the configuration was completed, PC2 obtained an IPv6 address and connectivity 
between R2 and PC2 was successfully established.  
 
Figure 11 shows the ping to the link-local and the IPv6 address of the interface Gi0/0 of 
R2. 
 
 
Figure 11. Pings from PC2 to R2 
 
Based on figure 11, the pilot test was successful. After examining the behaviour of IPv6, 
global unicast addresses will be assigned to sites Finance, Research and Engineering. 
[5,707.] 
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3.2.2 IPv6 Address Assignment 
 
From the IPv6 address block obtained from ISP1, IPv6 addresses will be manually as-
signed to sites. Table 3 shows the full addressing plan for the network. 
 
Table 3. Addressing Plan for Company West 
 
 
Device Interface
IPv4 
Address
Subnet 
Mask
IPv6 Address 
and Mask
Default 
Gateway
R1 S0/0/0 150.50.50.1 255.255.255.252 2001:db8:60:1::61 /127
S0/0/1 30.50.50.1 255.255.255.252
Gi0/0 172.16.1.1 255.255.255.0
Gi0/1 2001:db8:1:40::1 /64
Lo0 1.1.1.1 255.255.255.255
Lo1 2001:db8:1:4::1 /128
Tunnel 0 2001:db8:32:1::17 /127
R2 S0/0/0 32.50.50.1 255.255.255.252
S0/0/1 152.50.50.1 255.255.255.252 2001:db8:50:1::51 /127
Gi0/0 192.168.1.1 255.255.255.0 2001:db8:1:1::2 /64
Gi0/1 2001:db8:1:100::2 /64
Lo0 2.2.2.2 255.255.255.255
Lo1 2001:db8:1:2::2 /128
Tunnel 0 2001:db8:32:1::16 /127
ISP1 S0/0/0 150.50.50.2 255.255.255.252 2001:db8:60:1::60 /127
S0/0/1 152.50.50.2 255.255.255.252 2001:db8:50:1::50 /127
Lo0 10.10.10.1 255.255.255.0
Lo1 3001:db8::10 /128
ISP2 S0/0/0 32.50.50.2 255.255.255.252
S0/0/1 30.50.50.2 255.255.255.252
Lo0 20.20.20.1 255.255.255.0
SW1 VLAN 99 172.16.1.99 255.255.255.0
SW2 VLAN 99 192.168.1.99 255.255.255.0
SW3 VLAN 99
SW4 VLAN 99
PC1 NIC 172.16.1.100 255.255.255.0 172.16.1.1
PC2 NIC 192.168.1.100 255.255.255.0 192.168.1.1
PC2 NIC IPv6 Auto-Config 2001:db8:1:1::2
PC3 NIC IPv6 Auto-Config 2001:db8:1:100::2 
PC4 NIC IPv6 Auto-Config 2001:db8:1:40::1 
ADDRESS TABLE
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The IPv6 address assignment begins with site Finance and continues with site Research. 
Interface Lo1 will be created and interfaces Gi0/0 and Gi0/1 will be assigned IPv6 ad-
dresses. One of the IPv6 features is that a single interface can have multiple IPv6 ad-
dresses of any type and therefore there is no need to delete the ULA. 
 
R2(config)# ipv6 unicast-routing 
R2(config)#interface loopback 1 
R2(config-if)#ipv6 address 2001:db8:1:2::2/128 
R2(config)#interface gi0/0 
R2(config-if)#ipv6 address 2001:db8:1:1::2/64 
R2(config)# interface gi0/1 
R2(config-if)#ipv6 address 2001:db8:1:100::2/64 
 
Listing 3. IPv6 Address Assignment for R2 Interfaces 
 
Hosts on sites Finance and Research autoconfigured themselves and obtained IPv6 ad-
dresses, as illustrated in figures 12 and 13. 
 
 
Figure 12. Autoconfiguration Output of PC2  
 
 
Figure 13. Autoconfiguration Output of PC3 
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Connectivity was then tested from R2 by pinging both hosts as demonstrated in figure 
14. 
 
 
Figure 14. R2 Pings to PC2 and PC3 
 
The next requirement is to enable the IPv6 network on the Engineering site. The following 
commands were entered on R1: 
 
R1(config)#ipv6 unicast-routing 
R1(config)#interface loopback 1 
R1(config-if)#ipv6 address 2001:db8:1:4::1/128 
R1(config)#interface gi0/1 
R1(config-if)#ipv6 address 2001:db8:1:40::1/64 
 
Listing 4. Enabling IPv6 on Engineering 
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The host, PC4, on the Engineering site, obtained an IPv6 address dynamically and con-
nectivity was verified by pinging R1 from PC4 as demonstrated in figure 15. 
 
 
Figure 15. IP Configuration Output and Ping to PC4 
 
Pings from PC4 to R1 were successful, verifying the connectivity, as shown in figure 15. 
 
3.2.3 Interior Gateway Protocol Configuration 
 
At this point, after assigning an IPv6 address to all of the devices, the interior routing 
protocol needed to be configured. As previously mentioned in section 3.1, the network 
was running OSPFv2 for IPv4, and therefore OSPFv3 will be configured as the IGP pro-
tocol for the network. 
 
The site Finance is running both IPv4 and IPv6.  The address family feature allows for 
two router processes per interface but only one OSPF process per address family, and 
therefore R2 must have two process ids to support site Finance. The use of different 
process IDs results in each address family establishing different adjacencies, having a 
different link state database and computing a different shortest path tree. [7;16;17.] 
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The configuration for R2 is shown in listing 5 below. 
 
R2(config)# router ospfv3 1 
R2(config-router)#router-id 2.2.2.2 
R2(config-router)#auto-cost reference bandwidth 1000 
R2(config-router)##igonor lsa mospf 
R2(config-router)#log-adjacency-changes 
R2(config-router)#address-family ipv6 unicast 
R2(config-router-af)#area 1 range 2001:db8:1:1::/64 
R2(config-router-af)#area 1 range 2001:db8:1:2::2/128 
R2(config-router-af)#area 1 range 2001:db8:1:100::/64 
R2(config-router-af)#redistribute statics 
R2(config-router-af)#default-information originate always 
metric 100 metric-type 2 
R2(config-router-af)#exit-address-family 
R2(config-router)#router ospfv3 2 
R2(config-router)# address family ipv4 unicast 
R2(config-router-af)#area 1 range 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0 
R2(config-router-af)#area 1 range 2.2.2.2  255.255.255.255 
R2(config-router-af)#default-information originate always 
metric 100 metric-type 2 
R2(config-router-af)#end 
 
Listing 5. OSPFv3 configuration for R2 
 
Link-State Advertisement (LSA) type 6 multicast OSPFv3 packets are ignored, as they 
are not supported. After configuring OSPFv3 and the OSPFv3 area, OSPFv3 must be 
enabled on the interfaces. In OSPFv3 each interface must be enabled in the interface 
configuration mode. In OSPFv2, interfaces were indirectly enabled using the router con-
figuration mode.  
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OSPFv3 can be enabled on an interface with the IPv4 or the IPv6 address family or by 
enabling OSPFv3 on an interface as illustrated in listing 6. 
 
R2(config)# interface gi0/0 
R2(config-if)#ospfv3 2 area 1 ipv4 
R2(config)# interface loopback 0 
R2(config-if)#ospfv3 2 area 1 ipv4 
R2(config)# interface gi0/1 
R2(config-if)#ospfv3 1 area 1 ipv6 
R2(config)#interface loopback 1 
R2(config-if)#ipv6 ospf 1 area 0.0.0.1 
 
Listing 6. Enable OSPFv3 on an Interface 
 
R1 is connected to two networks, one that is IPv4 and running OSPFv2 and the other is 
an IPv6 network and running OSPFv3. OSPFv3 and OSPFv2 run independently of each 
other and run a separate SPF instance. Neither protocol is aware of the other, and for 
this reason the approach is to run OSPFv3 for both address families on R1. Each ad-
dress family will have its own OSPF process id and will be enabled on the correct inter-
face.  
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As site HQ is running OSPFv2, in order to enable OSPFv3, IPv6 needs to be enabled on 
the Gi0/0 interface first, but no IPv6 address assignment is needed as listing 7 illustrates.  
 
R1(config)#interface gi0/0 
R1(config-if)#ipv6 enable 
R1(config)#interface loopback 0 
R1(config-if)#ipv6 enable 
R1(config-if)#exit 
R1(config)# router ospfv3 1 
R1(config-router)#router-id 1.1.1.1 
R1(config-router)#auto-cost reference bandwidth 1000 
R1(config-router)#igonor lsa mospf 
R1(config-router)#log-adjacency-changes 
R1(config-router-af)#address-family ipv6 unicast 
R1(config-router-af)#area 3 range 2001:db8:1:4::1/128 
R1(config-router-af)#area 3 range 2001:db8:1:40::/64 
R1(config-router-af)#redistribute statics 
R1(config-router-af)#default-information originate always 
metric 100 metric-type 2 
R1(config-router-af)#exit-address-family 
R1(config-router)#router ospfv3 2 
R1(config-router)# address family ipv4 unicast 
R1(config-router-af)#area 0 range 172.16.1.0  255.255.255.0 
R1(config-router-af)#area 0 range 1.1.1.1  255.255.255.255 
R1(config-router-af)#default-information originate always 
metric 100 metric-type 2 
R1(config-router-af)#end 
 
Listing 7. Configure OSPFv3 on R1 
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Enabling the OSPFv3 on interfaces is shown in listing 8. 
 
R1(config)# interface gi0/0 
R1(config-if)#ospfv3 2 area 0 ipv4 
R1(config)# interface loopback 0 
R1(config-if)#ospfv3 2 area 0 ipv4 
 
R1(config)# interface gi0/1 
R1(config-if)#ospfv3 1 area 3 ipv6 
R1(config)# interface loopback 1 
R1(config-if)#ospfv3 1 area 3 ipv6 
 
Listing 8. Enable OPSFv3 on Interfaces 
 
After entering the configurations in listings 7 and 8, to check the routes the show ipv6 
route ospf command was entered on both R1 and R2 as illustrated in figures 16 and 
17. 
 
 
Figure 16. R1 Output for OSPFv3 Routes 
 
27 
 
 
Figure 17. R2 Output for OSPFv3 Routes 
 
As shown in figures 16 and 17, each router learns the routes to the other router via tunnel 
10. Figure 18 shows the OSPFv3 neighbours. 
 
 
Figure 18. Show OSPFv3 Neighbor Output  
 
As shown in figure 18, the routers have formed a neighbor relationship via tunnel 10. To 
verify the interfaces connected to each area the show OSPFv3 interfaces brief com-
mand was entered on R1, as illustrated in figure 19. 
 
 
Figure 19. Show Command for OSPFv3 Interfaces 
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As shown in figure 19, this command shows interfaces in each area with the correspond-
ing process ID as well as the state and cost. 
 
3.2.4 IPv6 Static Routing 
 
Finally the connectivity to the IPv6 Internet and between the sites needs to be configured. 
ISP1 has IPv6 Internet connectivity but IPv6 is not enabled internally. ISP1 can however 
advertise IPv6 prefixes over the IPv6 Internet by enabling static routing. ISP1 is therefore 
dual-stacked to support both IPv4 and IPv6. IPv6 addresses need to be assigned to 
serial links that are connected to ISP1. IPv6 static default routing needs to be enabled 
using a link local address as the next hop, pointing toward ISP1.  
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The network devices will then be able to ping the IPv6 Internet. Listing 9, illustrates the 
commands issued on ISP1, R1 and R2. 
 
ISP1(config)# ipv6 unicast-routing 
ISP1(config)#interface s0/0/1 
ISP1(config-if)#ipv6 address 2001:db8:50:1::50/127 
ISP1(config)#interface s0/0/0 
ISP1(config-if)#ipv6 address 2001:db8:60:1::60/127 
ISP1(config-if)#exit 
ISP1(config)#ipv6 route 2001:db8:1:1::/64 2001:db8:50:1::51 
ISP1(config)#ipv6 route 2001:db8:1:100::/64 
2001:db8:50:1::51 
ISP1(config)#ipv6 route 2001:db8:1:40::/64 
2001:db8:60:1::61 
ISP1(config)#ipv6 route 2001:db8:1:2::2/128 
2001:db8:50:1::51 
ISP1(config)#ipv6 route 2001:db8:1:4::1/128 
2001:db8:60:1::61 
 
R2(config)# interface s0/0/1 
R2(config-if)#ipv6 address 2001:db8:51:1::51/127 
R2(config-if)#exit 
R2(config)# ipv6 route ::/0 serial 0/0/1 
FE80::DA67:D9FF:FE84:2108 
R1(config)#interface s0/0/0 
R1(config-if)#ipv6 address 2001:db8:60:1::61/127  
R1(config)#ipv6 route ::/0 serial 0/0/0 
FE80::DA67:D9FF:FE84:2180 
 
Listing 9. IPv6 Address Assignments on Links to ISP1 
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To verify the IPv6 static routing configurations, the show ipv6 route ::/0 command 
was entered on both R1 and R2 as illustrated in figures 20 and 21. 
 
 
Figure 20. IPv6 Static Routing Verification for R1 
 
 
Figure 21. IPv6 Static Routing Verification for R2 
 
Figures 20 and 21 show that these routes are learned statically and therefore have a 
default administrative distance of 1.  The default static route ::/0 specifies that the desti-
nation IPv6 prefix and prefix length are all zeros.  
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ISP1 also needs to learn about the routes and by using the show ipv6 route command 
for the IPv6 prefix of the sites, verification of the route being added to the ISP1 routing 
table is obtained as illustrated in figure 22. 
 
 
Figure 22. Routing Entries for Site Prefixes on ISP1 
 
Figure 22 shows the path for each route and the routes are learnt statically. 
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The completed topology of CW after the configurations were completed as demonstrated 
in the following figure 23. 
 
 
 
Figure 23. Company West Dual-Stack Network Topology 
 
As shown in figure 23, each route to ISP1 is dual-stacked and has both IPv4 and IPv6 
addresses, allowing connectivity between IPv6 domains. 
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The hosts on each site are able to ping the Internet, and figure 24 shows the pings. 
 
 
Figure 24. PC 2 Pings to Internet and to its Default Gateway 
 
PC2 is able to successfully ping its own default gateway and the loopback on ISP1 which 
signifies IPv6 Internet connectivity. 
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3.3 Tunnelling Scenario 
 
CW requests IPv6 support, the ISP is unable to provide the support. To demonstrate this 
scenario, ISP1 is disconnected and ISP2, only IPv4-enabled, becomes the sole ISP as 
illustrated in figure 25. 
 
 
Figure 25. Company West Network Topology IPv4 ISP 
 
CW is multihomed, and therefore when the connection to ISP1 is lost, the route to ISP2 
becomes the primary route.  
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The following traceroute command in figure 26, demonstrates the IPv4 connectivity and 
the route preference before and after disconnecting the route to ISP1. 
 
 
Figure 26. Primary and Backup Route Preference Verification 
 
In order to achieve connectivity between IPv6 sites over an IPv4 network, tunnelling so-
lutions are required. There are different tunnelling modes to choose from, but for this lab, 
the GRE protocol tunnel was implemented. [18.] 
 
3.3.1 GRE Tunnel Configuration 
 
To create a GRE protocol tunnel between R1 and R2, the tunnel interfaces are first cre-
ated at each end and IPv6 addresses are manually assigned on each end of the tunnel 
interface. For stability purposes, the tunnel uses loopback interfaces with IPv4 addresses 
to carry traffic. The tunnel destination is the other router’s loopback interface, and the 
router will associate that interface with the tunnel. Once the tunnel interface has been 
created, it comes up and the tunnel mode defines the encapsulation, which in this case 
is the GRE protocol. 
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Figure 27 and figure 28 illustrate the GRE protocol tunnel configuration on R1 and R2. 
 
 
Figure 27. GRE tunnel configuration for R1 
 
 
Figure 28. GRE Protocol Tunnel Configuration for R2 
 
The tunnel interfaces have IPv6 addresses and the source and the destination are IPv4 
interfaces. To achieve full connectivity, OSPFv3 needs to be enabled on the tunnel in-
terfaces. The tunnel interfaces will be participating in the routing process like any other 
IPv6 link. The tunnel interfaces will be connected to the OSPFv3 backbone area 0, as 
the loopback interfaces are in different OSPF areas. The configuration is shown in listing 
10. 
 
R1(config)#interface tunnel 0 
R1(config-if)#ipv6 ospf 1 area 0 
 
R2(config)#interface tunnel 0 
R2(config-if)#ipv6 ospf 1 area 0 
 
Listing 10. Connecting Tunnel Interface to OSPFv3 Area 0 
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In addition to the configuration in listing 10, a static route needs to be configured for all 
destinations pointing to the tunnel interface, as shown in listing 11. 
 
R1(config)#ipv6 route ::/0 tunnel10 
FE80::DA67:D9FF:FE84:20B8 
R2(config)#ipv6 route ::/0 tunnel10 
FE80::DA67:D9FF:FE84:1898 
 
Listing 11. Static Route Pointing to Outgoing Interface of Tunnel  
 
To verify full connectivity across the tunnel, a ping and a trace route from R2 to host PC4 
was performed as shown in figure 29. 
 
 
Figure 29. Ping and Traceroute from R2 to PC4 
 
The result of the traceroute command shows that the packet enters the tunnel and leaves 
for its destination as shown in figure 29. It is now verified that CW has site-to-site con-
nectivity and that the tunnel is up and running.  
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Figure 30 shows the CW topology after the new configuration. 
 
 
Figure 30. Company West GRE Protocol Tunnel Network Topology 
 
The IPv4 traffic takes the path through ISP2 and the IPv6 traffic travels through the GRE 
tunnel. 
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3.3.2 IPsec over GRE Tunnel 
 
The GRE protocol tunnel itself provides no encryption and is just an encapsulation pro-
tocol. By default all Internet traffic is in clear text. In this implementation, in order to pro-
vide confidentiality, integrity and authentication for the tunnelled IPv6 traffic, the commu-
nication will be secured with the use of IPsec as an encryption technology. This mecha-
nism is illustrated in figure 31. 
 
 
Figure 31. GRE Protocol over IPsec Tunnel Mechanism 
 
As illustrated in figure 31, IPsec will encrypt the packets that are sent through the GRE 
protocol tunnel, providing security for the data traveling through the tunnel. IPsec is a 
protocol suite for securing IP communications by authenticating and encrypting each IP 
packet of a communication session. IPsec provides data authentication and anti-replay 
services in addition to data confidentiality services.  
 
The point-to-point GRE protocol first encapsulates routing protocols in the GRE protocol 
and then the GRE protocol packets are encapsulated in IPsec and encrypted. Figure 32 
shows the encapsulation process. The routing protocols will be associated with the tun-
nel interface, which is the IPv4 interface of the router, to send the GRE protocol traffic 
which should match the parameters of the crypto map and the interface and should 
therefore be encrypted by the IPsec. 
 
 
Figure 32. Tunnel Encapsulation Process  
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As shown in figure 32, the concept of crypto map is the same as a funnel. Crypto map is 
the initial and terminal point of the IPsec tunnel. The IPsec setting is grouped with the 
crypto map and applied to the interface. Traffic is allowed through the funnel, only if it 
meets the criteria and therefore policies are enforced.  
 
Prior to configuring anything else, an Access Control List (ACL) needs to be configured 
to allow the GRE protocol traffic as shown in listing 12. 
 
R1(config)#access-list 101 permit gre any any 
R2(config)#access-list 101 permit gre any any 
 
Listing 12. Configuration of GRE Protocol ACL 101 
 
Configuration in listing 12, allows for all the GRE protocol traffic from any source to any 
destination. 
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 IPsec is then configured on R1 and R2 as shown in listing 13. 
 
R1(config)#crypto isakmp policy 10 
R1(config-isakmp)#authentication pre-share 
R1(config-isakmp)#hash md5 
R1(config-isakmp)#group 2 
R1(config-isakmp)#encryption 3des 
R1(config-isakmp)#exit 
R1(config)#crypto isakmp key thesis-10 address 2.2.2.2 
255.255.255.255 
R1(config)#crypto ispsec transform-set thesis0 esp-3des 
esp-md5-hmac 
R1(config)#crypto map s2svpn 10 ipsec-isakmp 
R1(config-crypto-map)#set peer 2.2.2.2  
R1(config-crypto-map)#set transform-set thesis0 
R1(config-crypto-map)#match address 101 
 
R2(config)#crypto isakmp policy 10 
R2(config-isakmp)#authentication pre-share 
R2(config-isakmp)#hash md5 
R2(config-isakmp)#group 2 
R2(config-isakmp)#encryption 3des 
R2(config-isakmp)#exit 
R2(config)#crypto isakmp key thesis-10 address 1.1.1.1 
255.255.255.255 
R2(config)#crypto ipsec transform-set thesis0 esp-3des esp-
md5-hmac 
R2(config-crypto-map)#crypto map s2svpn 10 ipsec-isakmp 
R2(config-crypto-map)#set peer 1.1.1.1 
R2(config-crypto-map)#set transform-set thesis0 
R2(config-crypto-map)#match address 101 
 
Listing 13. IPsec Configuration of R1 and R2 
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The next step is to enable process switching on R1 and R2 in order for IPsec to encrypt 
the outgoing packets as shown in listing 14. 
 
R1(config)#interface serial0/0/1 
R1(config-if)#crypto map s2svpn 
 
Listing 14. Enabling IPsec on the Outgoing Interface 
 
After configuring the devices, the IPsec Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunnel can then 
be verified as shown in figure 33: 
 
 
Figure 33. Crypto Session Verification for R1 
 
As confirmed by figure 33, the crypto session is up and active, and the crypto map has 
been applied to interface Serial 0/0/1 facing towards the Internet. 
 
On R1 the command to check the Internet Security Association Management Protocol 
(ISAKMP) security associations (SAs) was entered, as is illustrated in figure 34. 
 
 
Figure 34. Crypto ISAKMP SA on R1 
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Based on figure 34, the state QM_IDLE shows the ISAKMP SA is built between peers. 
Following the verification that ISAKMP was active, IPsec was then verified as up and 
running on R1 as shown in figure 35. 
 
  
Figure 35. Output of Crypto IPsec SA Command 
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The output in figure 35 shows that IPsec SA is built between the peers. The encrypted 
tunnel is built between 1.1.1.1 (R1 Lo0) and 2.2.2.2 (R2 Lo0) for all the GRE protocol 
traffic. The two Encapsulation Security Payloads (ESP) SAs are built inbound and out-
bound and an Authentication Header (AH) is not used since there is no AH SAs. 
 
The final check is to verify full connectivity across the network. In order to verify the 
connectivity and path preference, several ping and trace route commands were sent 
from PC2 to every node in the network. The result is demonstrated in figures 36, 37 and 
38. 
 
 
Figure 36. Trace Route Output from PC2 to R1 Lo1 
 
 
Figure 37. Ping from PC2 to PC3 Followed by Trace Route 
 
 
Figure 38. Trace Route Output from PC2 to PC4. 
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As figures 36, 37 and 38 demonstrate, pings were successful and there is full connectivity 
and the traceroute command demonstrates the path that the packets take. [5,637;19;20.] 
 
4 Security Considerations 
 
The deployment of IPv6 is constantly increasing within different organisations. For the 
successful deployment of IPv6, security and quality of service (QoS) is essential, and 
must be of a similar quality to that of the IPv4 infrastructure. Despite the security im-
provements made in the IPv6 protocol, IPv6 networks are still exposed to different types 
of attacks. Some types of IPv4 attacks are not necessarily eliminated in IPv6, and some 
attacks are associated with the IPv6 protocol operation itself. [21.] 
 
4.1 Extension Header Threats 
 
Based on the IETF specification, the EH and the order in which they should be chained 
in an IPv6 packet are as follows: IPv6 main header, Hop-by-Hop Options header, Desti-
nation Options header, Routing header, Fragment header, Authentication header, En-
capsulating Security Payload header, Destination Options header and the Upper-layer 
header. An attacker is able to chain many EHs in order to pass through firewalls and 
intrusion detection systems. The attacker can also cause a DoS attack, as an intermedi-
ary device or a host might fail if they are incapable of processing many chained EHs. 
 
The covert channel security attack allows the attacker to stealthily transfer information 
by using processes that are not allowed to communicate by computer security policy. 
Some fields in the IPv6 EH can be used to create a covert channel. The hop-by-hop 
options header is used to carry optional information and is the only EH that should be 
processed by every device in the network [1] and can contain the IPv6 Router Alert Op-
tion, which makes the router intercept and look further inside the datagram. Routers with 
inefficient hardware and slower software might be vulnerable to DoS attack if flooded by 
many router alerts. 
 
Another EH threat is the Routing Header (RH) 0 which is a subtype of the RH. The packet 
construction allows multiple oscillations between two RH 0 processes or routers due to 
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the fact that multiple intermediate addresses may be included in one RH 0 while the 
same address may be repeated many times. Amplification of a stream of packets on the 
path between two remote routers by an attacker will then be allowed which in turn could 
cause congestion along remote paths and in turn act as a DoS. The seriousness of this 
attack is due its effect on the entire path and not only on the local networks or nodes. 
The IPv6 RH 0 was deprecated due to these serious attacks [25]. Although header type 
0 packets are deprecated, it nevertheless remains important to block potentially harmful 
traffic such as the RH0 or Hop-by-Hop (HbH) that may be directed toward the network. 
[1;22;23;24.] 
 
4.2 First Hop Security (FHS) Concerns 
 
FHS in IPv6 faces various local link (layer 2) security threats as the functionality in layer 
2 operations in IPv6 differ from those of IPv4. Link operations, constrained by link bound-
aries necessitate a node communicating with its neighbours. Link operations include lo-
cal network configuration, default gateway discovery and neighbor reachability tracking. 
The new patterns within the IPv6 link operations are very different to those of IPv4. They 
allow more end nodes on the link, thereby increasing the neighbor cache size on the end 
nodes and the default router which in turn increase the viability of DoS attacks. An addi-
tional threat in IPv6 is the protocols, Neighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP) and DHCP. 
Address management in IPv6 is de-centralised and could allow malicious hosts to abuse 
them. 
 
4.2.1 Router Discovery Threats 
 
Router discover, a new IPv6 process, where hosts can detect routers on an attached 
link, raises new FHS security issues. 
 
Attacks against IPv6 Router Discovery 
 
ICMPv6 messages, especially layer 2 multicast, are used by IPv6 neighbor discovery. 
ND is used by the hosts to locate the router on the attached link. As shown in figure 39, 
host A sends an ICMPv6, RS message to discover the router in its link. A legitimate 
router, shown as Router 1, responds with ICMPv6 router advertisement to let the hosts 
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know it is the router on the link. Then the host A installs the default route in its routing 
table pointing to Router 1.  
 
 
Figure 39. IPv6 Router Discovery Attack 
 
If a Malicious Intruder (MI), as shown in figure 39, is able to install itself in the link, MI 
could insert itself as the default router for host A, by spoofing the new router advertise-
ment to host A from Router 1 and setting the life time to 2 hours. "If RemainingLifetime 
is less than or equal to 2 hours, ignore the Prefix Information option with regard to the 
valid lifetime, unless the Router Advertisement from which this option was obtained has 
been authenticated". [15] 
 
Host A therefore removes the installed default routes to Router 1 after 2 hours. The MI 
is then able to send another router advertisement to insert itself as the default router. If 
the MI succeeds and becomes the default router, it will be able to see all the traffic from 
host A, and may gain additional information or deploy other types of attacks such as a 
MITM attack. [26.] 
 
Stateless Address Autoconfiguration Attack 
 
SLAAC eliminates the need for DHCP by enabling an endpoint to receive an IPv6 ad-
dress automatically. This mechanism is stateless and therefore no address allocation 
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tracking is required. It is based on the IPv6 prefix information in ICMPv6 router adver-
tisements. Host A requests an IPv6 address and Router 1 responds with an offer and 
the host then checks the address availability by performing DAD, and then starts to use 
it, as the shown in figure 40. 
 
 
Figure 40. IPv6 Autoconfiguration Attack 
 
As illustrated in figure 40, if a MI manages to insert itself into the link, it would be able to 
spoof an ICMPv6 router advertisement of Router 1 and set the life to 2 hours, using the 
same mechanisms as in the previous scenario. This results in the expiry of the host A 
address and the MI could send a new prefix through a router advertisement. Host A takes 
the new address and depending upon the Router 1 ACL, the new address may be denied 
access to the network. Without proper FHS and with IPv6 SLAAC in use, the MI, by 
spoofing two IPv6 router advertisements, could black hole hosts in their local link. 
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4.2.2 Neighbor Discovery Threats 
 
For hosts, the ND is the same as router discovery and it performs processes such as 
DAD. In ND, ICMPv6 messages are responsible for network discovery in much the same 
way as in Router Discovery. 
 
Address Resolution Attack 
 
IPv4 uses ARP to discover another host’s layer 2 address (MAC address), unlike IPv6 
which uses ICMPv6 messages. As shown in figure 41, host A sends an ICMPv6 Neigh-
bor Solicitation (NS) request to host B for its MAC address and host B responds with an 
ICMPv6 Neighbor Advertisement (NA) message. Host A learns the MAC address of host 
B and creates a neighbor cache entry that associates the MAC address of host B to its 
IPv6 address. 
 
 
Figure 41. IPv6 Address Resolution Attack 
 
If MI is able to insert itself in the link then it can impersonate host B and intercept all the 
traffic that was intended for host B, as is illustrated in figure 41. If FHS security is not 
configured properly, the MI can perform a MITM attack. 
 
Duplicate Address Detection Attack 
 
An endpoints uniqueness of an address is verified by the DAD protocol in IPv6. Figure 
42 illustrates the steps of duplicate address attack. 
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Figure 42.  Duplicate Address Detection Attack 
 
When host A sends NS messages for checking by DAD, the MI can claim the address is 
in use as illustrated in figure 42. The MI, by claiming every address that host A tries to 
perform DAD on, prevents host A from getting an IPv6 address and therefore host A will 
not be able to communicate with the network. 
 
Neighbor Cache Attack 
 
A host creates a neighbor cache after resolving another host’s MAC address. An inter-
face identifier of an IPv6 address is 64 bits, resulting in the possibility of 264 hosts on 
links and a corresponding 264 neighbor cache entries. These entries in comparison to the 
ARP table size in IPv4 are significantly larger.  
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The steps in a neighbor cache attack are demonstrated in figure 43. 
 
 
Figure 43. Neighbor Cache Attack 
 
The MI can cause DoS or simply fill the device cache entry by attacking the neighbor 
cache of the host or routing device, as illustrated in figure 43. If the MI connects to R1, 
and knows the network prefix that the hosts are connected to, it can scan the network by 
sending packets to hosts on the link. R1 tries to resolve the IPv6 address to forward the 
packets to their destination, irrespective of the presence of the destination host. R1’s 
neighbor cache will be filled with incomplete cache entries as result of absent hosts on 
the link until the timeout. In the event of the MI managing to scan a large portion of hosts 
within a few seconds, the cache entry of Router 1 could be filled and thereby cause a 
DoS condition.  
 
Traditional IPv4 attacks using viruses and email worms still remain a threat in IPv6 and 
although network scanning in IPv6 is not easy they are possible and in addition other 
alternatives exist. As IPsec is not a mandatory specification of IPv6, IPv4 attacks such 
as sniffing and flooding remain the same. Most attacks occur on the application layer 
where IPsec is powerless to prevent them. [21.] 
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5 Security Recommendations 
 
Security considerations are important but embedding best practice within the security 
policy and creating a security culture is vital. Some of the IPv6 security threats previously 
mentioned in section 4 and some of the best security practices follow below. 
 
5.1 ICMPv6 
 
ICMPv6 is essential for IPv6 functionality as it is used in establishing and maintaining 
communications. One method to eliminate threats associated with ICMPv6 messages, 
is ICMPv6 filtering. Establishing a strategy for filtering is of paramount importance as 
strict filtering can impact IPv6 communications. ICMPv6 messages should not be filtered 
by the ISP and instead should be left to the end users to create a policy on which com-
munication elements to filter.  
 
Due to the complexity of traffic an effective filtering strategy will be based on traffic type 
as not all traffic needs to be filtered. Traffic essential for network communication, estab-
lishment and maintenance, including error messages, connectivity checking messages 
and address configuration messages must never be dropped.  
 
Creating a policy is strongly recommended as certain types of traffic such as redirect 
messages could pose a critical risk and filtering rules need to be defined. A situation 
based decision is needed for unallocated messages. Experimental allocation messages 
and informational message types that are not explicitly defined by IANA should be 
dropped. [27.] 
 
5.2 Layer 3 Spoofing 
 
Spoofing is an attack mechanism that forges source addresses. To block malicious IPv6 
layer 3 traffic, Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding (unicast RPF) can be used. This pro-
tects the network by enabling routing devices to check the reachability of packet source 
addresses. Spoofed IP addresses are limited in the network as in packets with invalid 
source addresses will be discarded. [29.] 
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5.3 Extension Header 
 
In order to secure the network from a possible EH attack, it is important to block such 
harmful traffic. R1 was configured with the following commands in order to block HbH 
and RH0 as demonstrated in listing 15, and the access list is applied on the incoming 
interface. 
 
R1(config)#ipv6 access-list HBH 
R1(config-ipv6-acl)#deny hbh any any 
R1(config-ipv6-acl)#deny ipv6 any any routing-type 0 
R1(config-ipv6-acl)#permit icmp any any  
R1(config-ipv6-acl)#permit ipv6 any any 
 
R1(config)#interface serial0/0/0 
R1(config-if)#ipv6 traffic-filter HBH in 
R1(config)#interface serial0/0/1 
R1(config-if)#ipv6 traffic-filter HBH in 
 
Listing 15. HbH Access List and the Interface Application 
 
As shown in listing 15, the access list denies HbH and RH0 and permits ICMP and all 
other IPv6 traffic. IPv6 node tasks such as ND, depend on ICMPv6 functionality and in 
addition R1 needs to be able to send and reply to RS messages or sender nodes may 
experience DoS. 
 
In order to avoid the possibility of a DoS, a router must be able to send and receive RS 
messages, which in addition to ND, is one of the tasks performed by the IPv6 nodes 
which in turn rely on ICMPv6 functionality. 
 
5.4 Neighbor Discovery Protocol 
 
The SEND protocol is designed to secure NDP Vulnerabilities, particularly within a wire-
less environment where physical link security is not guaranteed. Cryptography can be 
used to secure IPv6 and MAC association as well as SLAAC. The Rivest, Shamir and 
Adelman (RSA) signature will affect performance and port security is needed to associ-
ate the port with the MAC address. IPsec is limited to manual configuration in NDP, due 
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to Internet Key Exchange (IKE) bootstrapping problems and is therefore not the preferred 
solution. [28.] 
 
5.5 Secure Transitioning 
 
Due to dual-stack running both IPv4 and IPv6, it is vulnerable to attacks to both protocols. 
Host security on a dual-stack network is of importance as it is needed to inspect and 
block from each stack. In a dual-stack network, if a host is running IPv4 and is protected, 
the IPv6 is enabled by default and the host does not run IPv6, it is prone to attacks. An 
attacker can send Router Advertisements and configure the host to IPv6 and perform 
various attacks. Best practice is to disable IPv6 on the host running IPv4 only or to con-
figure the network with IPv6. All IPv6 tunnelling mechanisms provide a solution for the 
IPv6 connectivity however IPsec is the only tunnelling mechanism that provides authen-
tication. [30.] 
 
6 Results 
 
The CW network represents a typical IPv4 infrastructure and is the baseline for this pro-
ject. Currently IPv4 is the predominant protocol used by enterprises, however due to 
limited IPv4 availability for expansion, and the fact that the Internet is moving to be fully 
IPv6 compliant, the only solution is to migrate to IPv6. By taking these factors into ac-
count, networking practices need to adapt to IPv6. With this in mind the network was 
designed using two completely different implementations to reflect the real case scenar-
ios faced by an average enterprise. These realistically represent the options and proba-
ble preferred solutions chosen for the needs of the different network environments. 
Choices of network design were based on factors such as timescale, cost efficiency, 
scalability, available expertise and infrastructure readiness.  
 
The first scenario represents a case where the ISP was able to offer IPv6 support and 
therefore the best practice would be to use the dual-stack mechanism. After each phase 
was configured, the network connectivity was tested before proceeding further. In the 
case of encountering a configuration error, the network behaviour was carefully moni-
tored in order to detect the cause of errors thereby enabling immediate remediation. Due 
to the complexity of the IPv6 address structure, in order to avoid human error, a logical 
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addressing scheme was crucial. A challenge that arose was that the HQ area 0 was 
running OSPFv2 and was unable to communicate with the rest of network due to the fact 
that OSPFv2 and OSPFv3 operate separately. In order to overcome the issue area 0 
was configured to run OSPFv3.  
 
As a result of these changes, IGP routes were learned and this was verified by using 
various show commands on the routing devices. Connectivity between domains was 
successfully established and tested by using ping commands. The traceroute command 
output, demonstrated that, by dual-stacking, the IPv6 traffic navigated the route via ISP1. 
 
In the second scenario, the ISP was unable to provide IPv6 services and therefore the 
only option was to use a tunnelling mechanism to provide IPv6 connectivity. The GRE 
protocol was chosen as the tunnelling protocol. The tunnel was configured between the 
two edge routers and the show command for the tunnel verified that the tunnel interface 
was up. Connectivity between IPv6 domains was verified using various extended pings 
on all the network devices. The IPv6 traffic travelled through the tunnel to its destination, 
as was confirmed by the use of the traceroute command. To overcome the absence of 
security in the GRE protocol tunnel, IPsec was configured to encrypt the data flow be-
tween the sites. When IPsec errors were encountered, the first troubleshooting step was 
to check for key mismatch as a result of spelling errors and secondly to ensure that the 
crypto map was applied to the correct interfaces. Operation of IPsec was confirmed with 
the use of debug crypto ipsec and show crypto ipsec sa commands.  
 
The ping results confirmed successful connectivity over the IPv4 networks as well as 
IPv6 networks. The network performed as designed, as was validated by full connectivity 
and therefore the goal of the project was achieved. 
7 Discussion 
 
IPv6 is a reality and over time will replace IPv4. Fully transitioning to IPv6 is disruptive, 
expensive, time-intensive and requires staff training. Transitioning mechanisms provide 
alternative solutions by allowing gradual network migration in a cost-efficient manner. 
Two of the most common implementations were practiced in this project. 
 
Dual-stack allows for both protocols to run independently of each other, to share network 
resources and to allow for native packet forwarding without additional encapsulation and 
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overhead. Over time, the IPv4 protocol can be replaced by the IPv6 protocol. Disad-
vantages to using dual-stack are the network resources required to keep data related to 
both protocols, such as two routing table and two topology tables. The administrative 
overhead increases due to the extra staff training and the complexity of the network 
maintenance and troubleshooting. In a dual-stack environment, security is essential, as 
all the threats to both protocols still exists. Another limiting factor is that IPv6 needs to 
be enabled from the ISP across the entire network to the client site.  
 
Another cost-effective approach is the tunnelling mechanism, which allows IPv6 domains 
to connect over an IPv4 backbone, by utilising routing based on labels. This method 
requires no additional core router configuration and few backbone infrastructure up-
grades. The downsides of tunnelling are that the underlying infrastructure services are 
not available, the users of the different protocols cannot communicate without dual-stack 
hosts, and the administration overhead increases as the number of tunnels grow. 
 
Security is of paramount importance in the migration process. IPsec is only a recommen-
dation and therefore without IPsec, IPv6 is very similar to IPv4. A number of FHS con-
cerns arise requiring appropriate protection mechanisms due to the functionality of IC-
MPv6. Layer 3 and above threats are almost identical to IPv4 threats, as well as appli-
cation layer attacks and mitigation techniques.  
 
When deciding to migrate to IPv6, there are various migration strategies available. The 
logical planning and design should be based on the existing infrastructure, future scala-
bility, available technical knowledge and support. 
8 Conclusion by Michael Swanson 
 
The goal of this project was to transition an existing IPv4 network to IPv6 utilising the 
best and most practical methods available. In order to effectively demonstrate the tran-
sitional processes, two likely scenarios were used to represent real challenges faced by 
enterprises attempting this. The basic scenarios were very real situations that enterprises 
are likely to face when addressing this issue. In the case of dual-stack, the ISP is able to 
provide support for IPv6 and in the case of the tunnel, the ISP is unable to provide sup-
port for IPv6. 
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After dual-stack was implemented, the network was extensively tested and performed 
as designed. The tunnel implementation was also successful and the network traffic suc-
cessfully negotiated the tunnel link and performed as designed.  
 
There are advantages to using transition mechanisms instead of implementing a native 
IPv6 network transitioning to IPv6. Some of the most obvious include cost as well as 
training administrators. An additional advantage however is that once a transition mech-
anism is in place, the network can function on IPv4 for as long as needed without imple-
menting IPv6 natively. Disadvantages include having to run two different protocols and 
a lag in network speed due to the mechanisms themselves. 
 
Limitations were placed on the project by constraints such as the limited number of de-
vices in the network, thereby restricting the number of different options that were able to 
be utilised. Though security and other mechanisms were implemented in this network, 
not every mechanism or protocol can be run on the limited network size and therefore 
the small scale of the network, in my opinion cannot truly reflect a real-life scenario. The 
network encompasses the most commonly used protocol, OSPF, as well as addresses 
security issues that these networks should be aware of. 
 
In achieving the goal of implementing a transition to IPv6, addressing many issues as-
sociated with the implementation and documenting each stage, we have achieved our 
stated objective and in the process have created a useful roadmap for anyone consider-
ing the change to benchmark against their network. 
9 Conclusion by Maryam Tavakoli Momtaz 
 
The goal of the project was to build a network and implement the most practised transi-
tioning mechanisms to the IPv6. Two separate networks were built to accommodate the 
two most possible scenarios in reality. The transitioning to IPv6 is an involved implemen-
tation that requires considerations and extensive evaluations of network elements and 
the needed services from the network. ISP’s ability to provide the necessary services 
and support for IPv6, determines the mechanisms that an enterprise should implement. 
When the ISP is IPv6-enabled or is able provide support for IPv6, the best practice is to 
use dual-stack mechanism, which was implemented in the first scenario in this project. 
Dual-stack has several benefits. It is cost and time efficient and the network can gradually 
remove the IPv4 and become a native IPv6 network.  
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Transitioning to IPv6 largely depends on the region and its need to move to IPv6, and 
therefore it is realistic that the ISPs are not able to provide the necessary support to route 
IPv6. Tunnelling was implemented in the second scenario to demonstrate this mecha-
nism and how to connect the IPv6 domains over and the IPv4 core network. Tunnelling 
has several benefits and allows the underlying network to function normally as it provides 
the IPv6 connection. The most important consideration is security which can be provided 
by IPsec. 
 
Due to limitations of implementing a larger network in the lab environment, the network 
was designed to reflect a real, small to average size enterprise network. However the 
network is scalable and the methods are applicable to a network of any size. Security is 
of importance when it comes to a network and with IPv6 introduction to networks and 
transitioning mechanisms, the network needs to be secured against attacks to both pro-
tocols. Further studies and practices can expose possible threats and provide the best 
security practices. 
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Appendix 1: Router 1 Running Configuration 
 
R1#show running-config 
Building configuration... 
 
Current configuration : 3984 bytes 
! 
! Last configuration change at 14:50:40 UTC Mon May 18 2015 
version 15.2 
service timestamps debug datetime msec 
service timestamps log datetime msec 
no service password-encryption 
! 
hostname R1 
! 
boot-start-marker 
boot-end-marker 
! 
no aaa new-model 
! 
ipv6 unicast-routing 
ipv6 multicast-routing 
ipv6 cef 
ip auth-proxy max-login-attempts 5 
ip admission max-login-attempts 5 
! 
no ip domain lookup 
ip cef 
! 
multilink bundle-name authenticated 
! 
license udi pid CISCO2911/K9 sn FCZ1627202V 
! 
redundancy 
! 
crypto isakmp policy 10 
 encr 3des 
 hash md5 
 authentication pre-share 
 group 2 
crypto isakmp key thesis-10 address 2.2.2.2 
! 
crypto ipsec transform-set thesis0 esp-3des esp-md5-hmac 
! 
crypto map s2svpn local-address Loopback0 
crypto map s2svpn 10 ipsec-isakmp 
 set peer 2.2.2.2 
 set transform-set thesis0 
 match address 101 
! 
interface Loopback0 
 description R1 loopback 
 ip address 1.1.1.1 255.255.255.255 
 ipv6 enable 
 ospfv3 2 area 0 ipv4 
! 
interface Loopback1 
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 description ipv6 R1 loopback 
 no ip address 
 ipv6 address 2001:DB8:1:4::1/128 
 ospfv3 1 area 3 ipv6 
! 
interface Tunnel10 
 no ip address 
 ip mtu 1400 
 ipv6 address 2001:DB8:32:1::17/127 
 ospfv3 1 area 0 ipv6 
 tunnel source Loopback0 
 tunnel destination 2.2.2.2 
! 
interface Embedded-Service-Engine0/0 
 no ip address 
 shutdown 
! 
interface GigabitEthernet0/0 
 description HQ VLAN 10 
 ip address 172.16.1.1 255.255.255.0 
 duplex auto 
 speed auto 
 ipv6 enable 
 ospfv3 2 area 0 ipv4 
! 
interface GigabitEthernet0/1 
 description ENG VLAN 40 
 no ip address 
 duplex auto 
 speed auto 
 ipv6 address 2001:DB8:1:40::1/64 
 ipv6 enable 
 ospfv3 1 area 3 ipv6 
! 
interface GigabitEthernet0/2 
 no ip address 
 shutdown 
 duplex auto 
 speed auto 
! 
interface Serial0/0/0 
 description R1->ISP1 
 ip address 150.50.50.1 255.255.255.252 
 ipv6 address 2001:DB8:60:1::61/127 
 ipv6 traffic-filter HBH in 
! 
interface Serial0/0/1 
 description R1->ISP2 
 ip address 30.50.50.1 255.255.255.252 
 ipv6 traffic-filter HBH in 
 crypto map s2svpn 
! 
router ospfv3 2 
 ! 
 address-family ipv4 unicast 
  default-information originate always metric 100 
  area 0 range 1.1.1.1 255.255.255.255 
  area 0 range 172.16.1.0 255.255.255.0 
 exit-address-family 
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! 
router ospfv3 1 
 router-id 1.1.1.1 
 ignore lsa mospf 
 auto-cost reference-bandwidth 1000 
 ! 
 address-family ipv6 unicast 
  area 3 range 2001:DB8:1:4::1/128 
  area 3 range 2001:DB8:1:40::/64 
  default-information originate always metric 100 
  redistribute static 
 exit-address-family 
! 
router bgp 500 
 bgp log-neighbor-changes 
 bgp dampening 
 network 1.1.1.1 mask 255.255.255.255 
 network 172.16.1.0 mask 255.255.255.0 
 neighbor 30.50.50.2 remote-as 200 
 neighbor 30.50.50.2 distribute-list 1 out 
 neighbor 150.50.50.2 remote-as 100 
 neighbor 150.50.50.2 distribute-list 1 out 
! 
ip forward-protocol nd 
! 
no ip http server 
no ip http secure-server 
! 
ip route 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 150.50.50.2 210 
ip route 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 30.50.50.2 220 
! 
access-list 1 permit 1.1.1.1 
access-list 1 permit 172.16.1.0 0.0.0.255 
access-list 101 permit gre any any 
ipv6 route ::/0 Tunnel10 FE80::DA67:D9FF:FE84:20B8 
ipv6 route ::/0 Serial0/0/0 FE80::DA67:D9FF:FE84:2108 
! 
ipv6 access-list HBH 
 deny hbh any any 
 deny ipv6 any any routing-type 0 
 permit icmp any any 
 permit ipv6 any any 
! 
control-plane 
! 
banner exec ^CC!!!BEWARE!!!Unauthorised access to this device is pro-
hibited^C 
banner login ^CC!!!STOP!!!Unauthorised access to this device is pro-
hibited^C 
banner motd ^CC!!!WAIT!!!Unauthorised access to this device is prohib-
ited^C 
! 
line con 0 
 exec-timeout 0 0 
 password 7 0958460C0A0C04 
 logging synchronous 
 login 
line aux 0 
 exec-timeout 0 0 
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 password 7 0958460C0A0C04 
 login 
line 2 
 no activation-character 
 no exec 
 transport preferred none 
 transport input all 
 transport output pad telnet rlogin lapb-ta mop udptn v120 ssh 
 stopbits 1 
line vty 0 4 
 exec-timeout 0 0 
 password 7 0835444B1A1016 
 login 
 transport input all 
! 
scheduler allocate 20000 1000 
! 
end 
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Appendix 2: Router 2 Running Configuration 
 
R2#show running-config 
Building configuration... 
 
Current configuration : 4086 bytes 
! 
! Last configuration change at 14:48:41 UTC Mon May 18 2015 
version 15.2 
service timestamps debug datetime msec 
service timestamps log datetime msec 
no service password-encryption 
! 
hostname R2 
! 
boot-start-marker 
boot-end-marker 
! 
no aaa new-model 
! 
ipv6 unicast-routing 
ipv6 multicast-routing 
ipv6 cef 
ip auth-proxy max-login-attempts 5 
ip admission max-login-attempts 5 
! 
no ip domain lookup 
ip cef 
! 
multilink bundle-name authenticated 
! 
license udi pid CISCO2911/K9 sn FCZ1627202Q 
! 
redundancy 
! 
crypto isakmp policy 10 
 encr 3des 
 hash md5 
 authentication pre-share 
 group 2 
crypto isakmp key thesis-10 address 1.1.1.1 
! 
crypto ipsec transform-set thesis0 esp-3des esp-md5-hmac 
! 
crypto map s2svpn local-address Loopback0 
crypto map s2svpn 10 ipsec-isakmp 
 set peer 1.1.1.1 
 set transform-set thesis0 
 match address 101 
! 
interface Loopback0 
 description R2 loopback 
 ip address 2.2.2.2 255.255.255.255 
 ipv6 enable 
 ospfv3 2 area 1 ipv4 
! 
interface Loopback1 
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 description IPv6 R2 loopback 
 no ip address 
 ipv6 address 2001:DB8:1:2::2/128 
 ospfv3 1 area 1 ipv6 
! 
interface Tunnel10 
 no ip address 
 ip mtu 1400 
 ipv6 address 2001:DB8:32:1::16/127 
 ospfv3 1 area 0 ipv6 
 tunnel source Loopback0 
 tunnel destination 1.1.1.1 
! 
interface Embedded-Service-Engine0/0 
 no ip address 
 shutdown 
! 
interface GigabitEthernet0/0 
 description FIN VLAN 20 
 ip address 192.168.1.1 255.255.255.0 
 duplex auto 
 speed auto 
 ipv6 address 2001:DB8:1:1::2/64 
 ipv6 address FD01:DB8:1:1::/64 eui-64 
 ospfv3 1 area 1 ipv6 
 ospfv3 2 area 1 ipv4 
! 
interface GigabitEthernet0/1 
 description RES VLAN 30 
 no ip address 
 duplex auto 
 speed auto 
 ipv6 address 2001:DB8:1:100::2/64 
! 
interface GigabitEthernet0/2 
 no ip address 
 shutdown 
 duplex auto 
 speed auto 
! 
interface Serial0/0/0 
 description R2->ISP2 
 ip address 32.50.50.1 255.255.255.252 
 ipv6 traffic-filter HBH in 
 crypto map s2svpn 
! 
interface Serial0/0/1 
 description R2->ISP1 
 ip address 152.50.50.1 255.255.255.252 
 ipv6 address 2001:DB8:50:1::51/127 
 ipv6 traffic-filter HBH in 
! 
router ospfv3 2 
 ! 
 address-family ipv4 unicast 
  default-information originate always metric 100 
  area 1 range 2.2.2.2 255.255.255.255 
  area 1 range 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0 
 exit-address-family 
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! 
router ospfv3 1 
 router-id 2.2.2.2 
 ignore lsa mospf 
 auto-cost reference-bandwidth 1000 
 ! 
 address-family ipv6 unicast 
  area 0 range 2001:DB8:32:1::16/127 
  area 1 range 2001:DB8:1:1::/64 
  area 1 range 2001:DB8:1:2::2/128 
  area 1 range 2001:DB8:1:100::/64 
  default-information originate always metric 100 
  redistribute static 
 exit-address-family 
! 
router bgp 600 
 bgp log-neighbor-changes 
 bgp dampening 
 network 2.2.2.2 mask 255.255.255.255 
 network 192.168.1.0 
 neighbor 32.50.50.2 remote-as 200 
 neighbor 32.50.50.2 distribute-list 1 out 
 neighbor 152.50.50.2 remote-as 100 
 neighbor 152.50.50.2 distribute-list 1 out 
! 
ip forward-protocol nd 
! 
no ip http server 
no ip http secure-server 
! 
ip route 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 152.50.50.2 210 
ip route 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 32.50.50.2 220 
! 
access-list 1 permit 2.2.2.2 
access-list 1 permit 192.168.1.0 0.0.0.255 
access-list 101 permit gre any any 
ipv6 route ::/0 Serial0/0/1 FE80::DA67:D9FF:FE84:2108 
ipv6 route ::/0 Tunnel10 FE80::DA67:D9FF:FE84:1898 
! 
ipv6 access-list HBH 
 deny hbh any any 
 deny ipv6 any any routing-type 0 
 permit icmp any any 
 permit ipv6 any any 
! 
control-plane 
! 
banner exec ^CC!!!BEWARE!!!Unauthorised access to this device is pro-
hibited^C 
banner login ^CC!!!STOP!!!Unauthorised access to this device is pro-
hibited^C 
banner motd ^CC!!!WAIT!!!Unauthorised access to this device is prohib-
ited^C 
! 
line con 0 
 exec-timeout 0 0 
 password 7 13111F17180517 
 logging synchronous 
 login 
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line aux 0 
 exec-timeout 0 0 
 password 7 13111F17180517 
 login 
line 2 
 no activation-character 
 no exec 
 transport preferred none 
 transport input all 
 transport output pad telnet rlogin lapb-ta mop udptn v120 ssh 
 stopbits 1 
line vty 0 4 
 exec-timeout 0 0 
 password 7 15060309172338 
 login 
 transport input all 
! 
scheduler allocate 20000 1000 
! 
end 
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Appendix 3: ISP1 Running Configuration 
 
ISP1#show running-config 
Building configuration... 
 
Current configuration : 2589 bytes 
! 
! Last configuration change at 14:56:55 UTC Mon May 18 2015 
version 15.2 
service timestamps debug datetime msec 
service timestamps log datetime msec 
no service password-encryption 
! 
hostname ISP1 
! 
boot-start-marker 
boot-end-marker 
! 
no aaa new-model 
! 
ipv6 unicast-routing 
ipv6 cef 
ip auth-proxy max-login-attempts 5 
ip admission max-login-attempts 5 
! 
no ip domain lookup 
ip cef 
! 
multilink bundle-name authenticated 
! 
license udi pid CISCO2911/K9 sn FCZ1627202L 
! 
redundancy 
! 
interface Loopback0 
 description ISP Internet network 
 ip address 10.10.10.1 255.255.255.0 
! 
interface Loopback1 
 no ip address 
 ipv6 address 3001:DB8::10/128 
! 
interface Embedded-Service-Engine0/0 
 no ip address 
 shutdown 
! 
interface GigabitEthernet0/0 
 no ip address 
 shutdown 
 duplex auto 
 speed auto 
! 
interface GigabitEthernet0/1 
 no ip address 
 shutdown 
 duplex auto 
 speed auto 
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! 
interface GigabitEthernet0/2 
 no ip address 
 shutdown 
 duplex auto 
 speed auto 
! 
interface Serial0/0/0 
 description ISP->R1 
 ip address 150.50.50.2 255.255.255.252 
 ipv6 address 2001:DB8:60:1::60/127 
 clock rate 128000 
! 
interface Serial0/0/1 
 description ISP1->R2 
 ip address 152.50.50.2 255.255.255.252 
 ipv6 address 2001:DB8:50:1::50/127 
 clock rate 128000 
! 
interface Serial0/1/0 
 no ip address 
 shutdown 
 clock rate 2000000 
! 
interface Serial0/1/1 
 no ip address 
 shutdown 
 clock rate 2000000 
! 
router bgp 100 
 bgp log-neighbor-changes 
 bgp dampening 
 network 10.10.10.0 mask 255.255.255.0 
 neighbor 150.50.50.1 remote-as 500 
 neighbor 152.50.50.1 remote-as 600 
! 
ip forward-protocol nd 
! 
no ip http server 
no ip http secure-server 
! 
ipv6 route 2001:DB8:1:1::/64 2001:DB8:50:1::51 
ipv6 route 2001:DB8:1:2::2/128 2001:DB8:50:1::51 
ipv6 route 2001:DB8:1:4::1/128 2001:DB8:60:1::61 
ipv6 route 2001:DB8:1:40::/64 2001:DB8:60:1::61 
ipv6 route 2001:DB8:1:100::/64 2001:DB8:50:1::51 
! 
control-plane 
! 
banner exec ^CC!!!BEWARE!!!Unauthorised access to this device is pro-
hibited^C 
banner login ^CC!!!STOP!!!Unauthorised access to this device is pro-
hibited^C 
banner motd ^CC!!!WAIT!!!Unauthorised access to this device is prohib-
ited^C 
! 
line con 0 
 exec-timeout 0 0 
 password 7 105A011C161E01 
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 logging synchronous 
 login 
line aux 0 
 exec-timeout 0 0 
 password 7 105A011C161E01 
 login 
line 2 
 no activation-character 
 no exec 
 transport preferred none 
 transport input all 
 transport output pad telnet rlogin lapb-ta mop udptn v120 ssh 
 stopbits 1 
line vty 0 4 
 exec-timeout 0 0 
 password 7 13111F17180517 
 login 
 transport input all 
! 
scheduler allocate 20000 1000 
! 
end 
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Appendix 4: ISP2 Running Configuration 
 
ISP2#show running-config 
Building configuration... 
 
Current configuration : 2049 bytes 
! 
! Last configuration change at 14:38:51 UTC Mon May 18 2015 
version 15.2 
service timestamps debug datetime msec 
service timestamps log datetime msec 
no service password-encryption 
! 
hostname ISP2 
! 
boot-start-marker 
boot-end-marker 
! 
no aaa new-model 
! 
no ipv6 cef 
ip auth-proxy max-login-attempts 5 
ip admission max-login-attempts 5 
! 
no ip domain lookup 
ip cef 
! 
multilink bundle-name authenticated 
! 
license udi pid CISCO2911/K9 sn FCZ1627202T 
! 
redundancy 
! 
interface Loopback0 
 description ISP2 Internet network 
 ip address 20.20.20.1 255.255.255.0 
! 
interface Embedded-Service-Engine0/0 
 no ip address 
 shutdown 
! 
interface GigabitEthernet0/0 
 no ip address 
 shutdown 
 duplex auto 
 speed auto 
! 
interface GigabitEthernet0/1 
 no ip address 
 shutdown 
 duplex auto 
 speed auto 
! 
interface GigabitEthernet0/2 
 no ip address 
 shutdown 
 duplex auto 
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 speed auto 
! 
interface Serial0/0/0 
 description ISP2->R2 
 ip address 32.50.50.2 255.255.255.252 
 clock rate 128000 
! 
interface Serial0/0/1 
 description ISP2->R1 
 ip address 30.50.50.2 255.255.255.252 
 clock rate 128000 
! 
router bgp 200 
 bgp log-neighbor-changes 
 bgp dampening 
 network 20.20.20.0 mask 255.255.255.0 
 neighbor 30.50.50.1 remote-as 500 
 neighbor 32.50.50.1 remote-as 600 
! 
ip forward-protocol nd 
! 
no ip http server 
no ip http secure-server 
! 
control-plane 
! 
banner exec ^CC!!!BEWARE!!!Unauthorised access to this device is pro-
hibited^C 
banner login ^CC!!!STOP!!!Unauthorised access to this device is pro-
hibited^C 
banner motd ^CC!!!WAIT!!!Unauthorised access to this device is prohib-
ited^C 
! 
line con 0 
 exec-timeout 0 0 
 password 7 105A011C161E01 
 logging synchronous 
 login 
line aux 0 
 exec-timeout 0 0 
 password 7 105A011C161E01 
 login 
line 2 
 no activation-character 
 no exec 
 transport preferred none 
 transport input all 
 transport output pad telnet rlogin lapb-ta mop udptn v120 ssh 
 stopbits 1 
line vty 0 4 
 exec-timeout 0 0 
 password 7 15060309172338 
 login 
 transport input all 
! 
scheduler allocate 20000 1000 
! 
end 
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Appendix 5: Switch 1 Running Configuration 
 
SW1#show running-config 
Building configuration... 
 
Current configuration : 7293 bytes 
! 
version 15.0 
no service pad 
service timestamps debug datetime msec 
service timestamps log datetime msec 
service password-encryption 
! 
hostname SW1 
! 
boot-start-marker 
boot-end-marker 
! 
! 
no aaa new-model 
system mtu routing 1500 
! 
! 
ip dhcp snooping vlan 10 
ip dhcp snooping 
no ip domain-lookup 
! 
! 
crypto pki trustpoint TP-self-signed-112546176 
 enrollment selfsigned 
 subject-name cn=IOS-Self-Signed-Certificate-112546176 
 revocation-check none 
 rsakeypair TP-self-signed-112546176 
! 
! 
crypto pki certificate chain TP-self-signed-112546176 
 certificate self-signed 01 
  30820229 30820192 A0030201 02020101 300D0609 2A864886 F70D0101 
05050030 
  30312E30 2C060355 04031325 494F532D 53656C66 2D536967 6E65642D 
43657274 
  69666963 6174652D 31313235 34363137 36301E17 0D393330 33303130 
30303035 
  365A170D 32303031 30313030 30303030 5A303031 2E302C06 03550403 
1325494F 
  532D5365 6C662D53 69676E65 642D4365 72746966 69636174 652D3131 
32353436 
  31373630 819F300D 06092A86 4886F70D 01010105 0003818D 00308189 
02818100 
  C7FF4C1A F19F00EA 12A0EAC5 1F7F6E5D B9610DB9 C7FAA642 BE223FEF 
E446D1CC 
  3861757F 0CE14D5C 8DE50702 98A58C6B E532D0C4 6D8153ED 79EE1E85 
F1B35929 
  4AB7A172 6BF77748 362A89A1 B29CFD74 BB16544A B8D92BCF 679CDAFD 
DEC7C36A 
  9F172919 0EF1BBF1 B7BF2577 F9A6B4E6 63A6A0E7 ABFB6DFF B3FD788B 
3E00717B 
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  02030100 01A35330 51300F06 03551D13 0101FF04 05300301 01FF301F 
0603551D 
  23041830 16801433 48C406AE 821DC418 25BD1BB9 F77086FB 6B89B230 
1D060355 
  1D0E0416 04143348 C406AE82 1DC41825 BD1BB9F7 7086FB6B 89B2300D 
06092A86 
  4886F70D 01010505 00038181 00BA17BC 56745BFE 0842F952 4ABD8B06 
F0268C7E 
  B73D72D1 8367A00A C4086668 372F228C A0D04EAC 3BFAD557 2D7B76CE 
0D35E579 
  19C864F3 F87324FA F6A44F5F 68337D14 48B98624 CD1D52EA AF79F4DD 
A6643230 
  2D222C90 7E233374 5B8E72F4 92C0AE38 FD10B40E 174F4DE0 A1A8B515 
9B3A2581 
  38447DC8 94533E95 E00D1F3B 3A 
        quit 
! 
! 
! 
! 
! 
spanning-tree mode pvst 
spanning-tree extend system-id 
! 
vlan internal allocation policy ascending 
! 
! 
! 
! 
! 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/1 
 switchport access vlan 10 
 switchport mode access 
 ip dhcp snooping trust 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/2 
 switchport access vlan 10 
 switchport mode access 
 ip dhcp snooping trust 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/3 
 switchport mode access 
 switchport port-security maximum 2 
 switchport port-security 
 switchport port-security mac-address sticky 
 shutdown 
 ip dhcp snooping limit rate 20 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/4 
 switchport mode access 
 switchport port-security maximum 2 
 switchport port-security 
 switchport port-security mac-address sticky 
 shutdown 
 ip dhcp snooping limit rate 20 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/5 
 switchport mode access 
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 switchport port-security maximum 2 
 switchport port-security 
 switchport port-security mac-address sticky 
 shutdown 
 ip dhcp snooping limit rate 20 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/6 
 switchport mode access 
 switchport port-security maximum 2 
 switchport port-security 
 switchport port-security mac-address sticky 
 shutdown 
 ip dhcp snooping limit rate 20 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/7 
 switchport mode access 
 switchport port-security maximum 2 
 switchport port-security 
 switchport port-security mac-address sticky 
 shutdown 
 ip dhcp snooping limit rate 20 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/8 
 switchport mode access 
 switchport port-security maximum 2 
 switchport port-security 
 switchport port-security mac-address sticky 
 shutdown 
 ip dhcp snooping limit rate 20 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/9 
 switchport mode access 
 switchport port-security maximum 2 
 switchport port-security 
 switchport port-security mac-address sticky 
 shutdown 
 ip dhcp snooping limit rate 20 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/10 
 switchport mode access 
 switchport port-security maximum 2 
 switchport port-security 
 switchport port-security mac-address sticky 
 shutdown 
 ip dhcp snooping limit rate 20 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/11 
 switchport mode access 
 switchport port-security maximum 2 
 switchport port-security 
 switchport port-security mac-address sticky 
 shutdown 
 ip dhcp snooping limit rate 20 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/12 
 switchport mode access 
 switchport port-security maximum 2 
 switchport port-security 
 switchport port-security mac-address sticky 
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 shutdown 
 ip dhcp snooping limit rate 20 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/13 
 switchport mode access 
 switchport port-security maximum 2 
 switchport port-security 
 switchport port-security mac-address sticky 
 shutdown 
 ip dhcp snooping limit rate 20 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/14 
 switchport mode access 
 switchport port-security maximum 2 
 switchport port-security 
 switchport port-security mac-address sticky 
 shutdown 
 ip dhcp snooping limit rate 20 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/15 
 switchport mode access 
 switchport port-security maximum 2 
 switchport port-security 
 switchport port-security mac-address sticky 
 shutdown 
 ip dhcp snooping limit rate 20 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/16 
 switchport mode access 
 switchport port-security maximum 2 
 switchport port-security 
 switchport port-security mac-address sticky 
 shutdown 
 ip dhcp snooping limit rate 20 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/17 
 switchport mode access 
 switchport port-security maximum 2 
 switchport port-security 
 switchport port-security mac-address sticky 
 shutdown 
 ip dhcp snooping limit rate 20 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/18 
 switchport mode access 
 switchport port-security maximum 2 
 switchport port-security 
 switchport port-security mac-address sticky 
 shutdown 
 ip dhcp snooping limit rate 20 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/19 
 switchport mode access 
 switchport port-security maximum 2 
 switchport port-security 
 switchport port-security mac-address sticky 
 shutdown 
 ip dhcp snooping limit rate 20 
! 
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interface FastEthernet0/20 
 switchport mode access 
 switchport port-security maximum 2 
 switchport port-security 
 switchport port-security mac-address sticky 
 shutdown 
 ip dhcp snooping limit rate 20 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/21 
 switchport mode access 
 switchport port-security maximum 2 
 switchport port-security 
 switchport port-security mac-address sticky 
 shutdown 
 ip dhcp snooping limit rate 20 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/22 
 switchport mode access 
 switchport port-security maximum 2 
 switchport port-security 
 switchport port-security mac-address sticky 
 shutdown 
 ip dhcp snooping limit rate 20 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/23 
 switchport mode access 
 switchport port-security maximum 2 
 switchport port-security 
 switchport port-security mac-address sticky 
 shutdown 
 ip dhcp snooping limit rate 20 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/24 
 switchport mode access 
 switchport port-security maximum 2 
 switchport port-security 
 switchport port-security mac-address sticky 
 shutdown 
 ip dhcp snooping limit rate 20 
! 
interface GigabitEthernet0/1 
 shutdown 
! 
interface GigabitEthernet0/2 
 shutdown 
! 
interface Vlan1 
 no ip address 
 shutdown 
! 
interface Vlan99 
 ip address 172.16.1.99 255.255.255.0 
! 
ip default-gateway 172.16.1.1 
ip http server 
ip http secure-server 
! 
banner exec ^C!!!BEWARE!!!Unauthorised access to this device is pro-
hibited^C 
Appendix 5 
6 (6) 
 
 
banner login ^C!!!STOP!!!Unauthorised access to this device is prohib-
ited^C 
banner motd ^CUnauthorized access to this device is prohibited!^C 
! 
line con 0 
 exec-timeout 0 0 
 password 7 105A011C161E01 
 logging synchronous 
 login 
line vty 0 4 
 exec-timeout 0 0 
 password 7 105A011C161E01 
 login 
line vty 5 15 
 login 
! 
end 
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Appendix 6: Switch 2 Running Configuration 
 
SW2#show running-config 
Building configuration... 
 
Current configuration : 5310 bytes 
! 
version 15.0 
no service pad 
service timestamps debug datetime msec 
service timestamps log datetime msec 
service password-encryption 
! 
hostname SW2 
! 
boot-start-marker 
boot-end-marker 
! 
! 
no aaa new-model 
system mtu routing 1500 
! 
! 
ip dhcp snooping vlan 20 
ip dhcp snooping 
no ip domain-lookup 
! 
! 
crypto pki trustpoint TP-self-signed-3760990464 
 enrollment selfsigned 
 subject-name cn=IOS-Self-Signed-Certificate-3760990464 
 revocation-check none 
 rsakeypair TP-self-signed-3760990464 
! 
! 
crypto pki certificate chain TP-self-signed-3760990464 
 certificate self-signed 01 
  3082022B 30820194 A0030201 02020101 300D0609 2A864886 F70D0101 
05050030 
  31312F30 2D060355 04031326 494F532D 53656C66 2D536967 6E65642D 
43657274 
  69666963 6174652D 33373630 39393034 3634301E 170D3933 30333031 
30303030 
  35365A17 0D323030 31303130 30303030 305A3031 312F302D 06035504 
03132649 
  4F532D53 656C662D 5369676E 65642D43 65727469 66696361 74652D33 
37363039 
  39303436 3430819F 300D0609 2A864886 F70D0101 01050003 818D0030 
81890281 
  81008B5E 41F3039A D69F6A80 A884361C C0870AEB EE90DDA4 4AE3B5AF 
3A725D5A 
  BC965926 19955318 E0920D7C 171EC846 499FD712 6AC225F3 7F0EC239 
0AEE30A3 
  D2BB2DC8 3FDD71EC 585DC033 420DBC92 DBA8AA84 0DDFA677 75F1A0C0 
392A4C71 
  0C02CB8E 6BF3FF3E E5B1D6E8 F4B5E7F6 2BBA3386 1A573454 492908D7 
76AB5E6E 
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  B4E70203 010001A3 53305130 0F060355 1D130101 FF040530 030101FF 
301F0603 
  551D2304 18301680 149FCCC8 C5CB2096 ED52E8AE 606B3F74 95272B7E 
44301D06 
  03551D0E 04160414 9FCCC8C5 CB2096ED 52E8AE60 6B3F7495 272B7E44 
300D0609 
  2A864886 F70D0101 05050003 81810002 A93FDB8C BC46D3D2 0284DC74 
4436A4A2 
  6951CBB9 2CBB5C8A 6FF1C8A5 AD7EE84E 3228E317 72A2A0AA F11D354D 
98703D82 
  3983AB99 F4637591 38F3F9EA CCC0551B 7D4A312C 30DEF567 1DE1A1CC 
84F82F66 
  E78A7B7C 655A8188 90E389ED 64AD2A71 119064BF 42E2C97C 55DBBE73 
0A16B7A9 
  FFE88D3D E1766944 1EAAD5E2 74A26F 
        quit 
! 
! 
! 
! 
! 
spanning-tree mode pvst 
spanning-tree extend system-id 
! 
vlan internal allocation policy ascending 
! 
! 
! 
! 
! 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/1 
 switchport access vlan 20 
 switchport mode access 
 ip dhcp snooping trust 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/2 
 switchport access vlan 20 
 switchport mode access 
 ip dhcp snooping trust 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/3 
 switchport mode access 
 switchport port-security 
 ip dhcp snooping limit rate 20 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/4 
 switchport mode access 
 switchport port-security 
 ip dhcp snooping limit rate 20 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/5 
 switchport mode access 
 switchport port-security 
 ip dhcp snooping limit rate 20 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/6 
 switchport mode access 
 switchport port-security 
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 ip dhcp snooping limit rate 20 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/7 
 switchport mode access 
 switchport port-security 
 ip dhcp snooping limit rate 20 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/8 
 switchport mode access 
 switchport port-security 
 ip dhcp snooping limit rate 20 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/9 
 switchport mode access 
 switchport port-security 
 ip dhcp snooping limit rate 20 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/10 
 switchport mode access 
 switchport port-security 
 ip dhcp snooping limit rate 20 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/11 
 switchport mode access 
 switchport port-security 
 ip dhcp snooping limit rate 20 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/12 
 switchport mode access 
 switchport port-security 
 ip dhcp snooping limit rate 20 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/13 
 switchport mode access 
 switchport port-security 
 ip dhcp snooping limit rate 20 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/14 
 switchport mode access 
 switchport port-security 
 ip dhcp snooping limit rate 20 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/15 
 switchport mode access 
 switchport port-security 
 ip dhcp snooping limit rate 20 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/16 
 switchport mode access 
 switchport port-security 
 ip dhcp snooping limit rate 20 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/17 
 switchport mode access 
 switchport port-security 
 ip dhcp snooping limit rate 20 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/18 
 switchport mode access 
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 switchport port-security 
 ip dhcp snooping limit rate 20 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/19 
 switchport mode access 
 switchport port-security 
 ip dhcp snooping limit rate 20 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/20 
 switchport mode access 
 switchport port-security 
 ip dhcp snooping limit rate 20 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/21 
 switchport mode access 
 switchport port-security 
 ip dhcp snooping limit rate 20 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/22 
 switchport mode access 
 switchport port-security 
 ip dhcp snooping limit rate 20 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/23 
 switchport mode access 
 switchport port-security 
 ip dhcp snooping limit rate 20 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/24 
 switchport mode access 
 switchport port-security 
 ip dhcp snooping limit rate 20 
! 
interface GigabitEthernet0/1 
 shutdown 
! 
interface GigabitEthernet0/2 
 shutdown 
! 
interface Vlan1 
 no ip address 
 shutdown 
! 
interface Vlan99 
 ip address 192.168.1.99 255.255.255.0 
! 
ip default-gateway 192.168.1.1 
ip http server 
ip http secure-server 
! 
banner exec ^C!!!BEWARE!!!Unauthorised access to this device is pro-
hibited^C 
banner login ^C!!!STOP!!!Unauthorised access to this device is prohib-
ited^C 
banner motd ^C!!!WAIT!!!Unauthorised access to this device is prohib-
ited^C 
! 
line con 0 
 exec-timeout 0 0 
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 password 7 02120C5E180F1C 
 logging synchronous 
 login 
line vty 0 4 
 exec-timeout 0 0 
 password 7 02120C5E180F1C 
 login 
line vty 5 15 
 login 
! 
end  
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Appendix 7: Switch 4 Running Configuration 
 
SW4#show running-config 
Building configuration... 
 
Current configuration : 3715 bytes 
! 
version 12.2 
no service pad 
service timestamps debug datetime msec 
service timestamps log datetime msec 
service password-encryption 
! 
hostname SW4 
! 
boot-start-marker 
boot-end-marker 
! 
! 
! 
! 
no aaa new-model 
system mtu routing 1500 
no ip domain-lookup 
! 
! 
ipv6 unicast-routing 
! 
! 
crypto pki trustpoint TP-self-signed-2448865152 
 enrollment selfsigned 
 subject-name cn=IOS-Self-Signed-Certificate-2448865152 
 revocation-check none 
 rsakeypair TP-self-signed-2448865152 
! 
! 
crypto pki certificate chain TP-self-signed-2448865152 
 certificate self-signed 01 
  3082023C 308201A5 A0030201 02020101 300D0609 2A864886 F70D0101 
04050030 
  31312F30 2D060355 04031326 494F532D 53656C66 2D536967 6E65642D 
43657274 
  69666963 6174652D 32343438 38363531 3532301E 170D3933 30333031 
30303031 
  30315A17 0D323030 31303130 30303030 305A3031 312F302D 06035504 
03132649 
  4F532D53 656C662D 5369676E 65642D43 65727469 66696361 74652D32 
34343838 
  36353135 3230819F 300D0609 2A864886 F70D0101 01050003 818D0030 
81890281 
  8100CEDD F37522AA BAB9F383 EABAA2C5 9D78EC58 A1CEB74B FE94627B 
9A287F4E 
  CF489C98 D3D48B0C 77F24D33 BDA71292 F5C13206 C4120E55 38063C22 
01762932 
  0499DE08 D6BDDBDA D47410D6 DD3996BB C1BAAC8A 835DC450 0B0EC511 
43F7FD0A 
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  7B088D35 3B3974D4 F6985966 6004EF00 609E5222 BEB16006 E876873A 
E394B156 
  23790203 010001A3 64306230 0F060355 1D130101 FF040530 030101FF 
300F0603 
  551D1104 08300682 04535734 2E301F06 03551D23 04183016 80142310 
847B33F7 
  20B9170E A8124405 A9699A0C 4849301D 0603551D 0E041604 14231084 
7B33F720 
  B9170EA8 124405A9 699A0C48 49300D06 092A8648 86F70D01 01040500 
03818100 
  1DA0548D EA8E1DDD 532DF640 09376C34 BBB97ACE F7DFFB61 73510EB9 
53679901 
  72F2D688 AB347DEE 23D26699 B0C635A0 232336AE 6A892BAD 448AD168 
0DA7721A 
  BF445698 73C0F44C D625E49F B67466E3 5C92FFD7 66F8A6FE C41A1F4A 
7614FB05 
  8C999536 6F508D91 986ED78D 81F77141 B74DD691 1AC572D1 ACD93BD5 
C7A5031B 
  quit 
! 
! 
! 
spanning-tree mode pvst 
spanning-tree extend system-id 
! 
vlan internal allocation policy ascending 
! 
! 
! 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/1 
 switchport access vlan 40 
 switchport mode access 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/2 
 switchport access vlan 40 
 switchport mode access 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/3 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/4 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/5 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/6 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/7 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/8 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/9 
 shutdown 
! 
Appendix 7 
3 (4) 
 
 
interface FastEthernet0/10 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/11 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/12 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/13 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/14 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/15 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/16 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/17 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/18 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/19 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/20 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/21 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/22 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/23 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/24 
 shutdown 
! 
interface GigabitEthernet0/1 
 shutdown 
! 
interface GigabitEthernet0/2 
 shutdown 
! 
interface Vlan1 
 no ip address 
 shutdown 
! 
interface Vlan99 
 no ip address 
 ipv6 address 2001:DB8:1:40::99/64 
! 
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ip classless 
ip http server 
ip http secure-server 
! 
! 
ipv6 route ::/0 2001:DB8:1:40::1 
! 
! 
! 
banner exec ^C!!!BEWARE!!!Unauthorised access to this device prohib-
ited^C 
banner login ^C!!!STOP!!!Unauthorised access to this device prohib-
ited^C 
banner motd ^C!!!WAIT!!!Unauthorised access to this device prohib-
ited^C 
! 
line con 0 
 exec-timeout 0 0 
 password 7 061207245F471A 
 logging synchronous 
 login 
line vty 0 4 
 exec-timeout 0 0 
 password 7 061207245F471A 
 login 
line vty 5 15 
 login 
! 
end 
 
